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ADMIRALTY LAW 
ARE SEAMEN STILL THE "WARDS OF 
ADMIRALTY"? SUTTON v. EARLES: NINTH 
CIRCUIT EXTENDS LOSS OF SOCIETY 
DAMAGES TO NON-DEPENDENT PARENTS 
OF NON-SEAMEN IN MARITIME WRONGFUL 
DEATH ACTION 
"Have you news of my boy Jack?" 
Not this tide. 
"When d'you think that he'll come back?" 
Not with this wind blowing, and this tide. 
"Has anyone else had word of him?" 
Not this tide. 
For what is sunk will hardly swim, 
Not with this wind blowing, and this tide. 
"Oh, dear, what comfort can I find?" 
None this tide, 
Nor any tide, 
Except he did not shame his kind -
Not even with the wind blowing, and that 
tide. 
Then hold your head up all the more, 
This tide, 
And every tide; 
Because he was the son you bore, 
And gave to that wind blowing and that 
tide.! 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In Sutton v. Earles2 ("Earles Ir), the Ninth Circuit ad-
dressed an issue of first impression, namely whether in a 
wrongful death action, under general maritime law,3 loss of 
society damages' could be awarded to the parents of non-sea-
<Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1940) (1914-18). Kipling's poem, portraying the 
anguish of the mother of a seaman lost at sea, captures the essence of the loss of 
society issue as it relates to the American merchant seaman's struggle for a stan-
dard of living on par with the rest of American society. For a concise yet compre-
hensive historical background of the struggle for seamen's rights, see chapter one 
of Mariam Sherar's sociological study of the American merchant seaman. See 
MARIAM G. SHERAR, SHIPPING OUT 1-6 (Cornell Maritime Press, Inc. 1973). It is 
the author's hope that readers keep this poem in mind, as well as the struggle for 
parity it symbolizes, when considering this review of recent admiralty law cases. 
2. Sutton v. Earles, 26 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 1994) (per Canby, J.; the other 
panel members were Tang, J., and Beezer, J.), remand before appeal, Earles v. 
United States, 935 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1991) (per Leavy, J, with whom Browning, 
J., joined; Pregerson, J., dissenting). This case is hereinafter referred to as "Earles 
II" because it was decided on remand from a prior Ninth Circuit decision, Earles 
v. United States, which the court refers to in Sutton v. Earles as "Earles I." See 
Earles II, 26 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir. 1994). 
3. The general maritime law of the United States is federal court-made law 
that, absent preemptive legislation, applies to cases brought in pure admiralty 
jurisdiction (federal court only), as well as other maritime cases (brought either in 
state or federal court, but relying on maritime principles). U.S. CONST. art. III, § 
2, cl. 1 (extending the judicial power of the United States to all cases of admiralty 
and maritime jurisdiction). See 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988) (codifying the federal 
courts' authority to develop a substantive body of general maritime law); Southern 
Pacific v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 254 (1917) (holding that state law that changes, 
modifies, or affects the interstate uniformity of the general maritime law is uncon-
stitutional). See also THoMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAw § 4-
1, at 121 n.3 (1987 & Supp. 1992). 
4. Loss of society damages are those damages in a wrongful death action 
which compensate the decedent's beneficiary for deprivation of the decedent's con-
tinued existence, including: love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort, 
and protection. Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 585 (1974). See gener-
ally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 127, at 949-54 
(5th ed. 1984) (noting developments, trends, and issues concerning awards for loss 
of society in the common law of torts). Loss of society damages are non-pecuniary, 
but recovery for the dependent's mental anguish or grief is prohibited. Gaudet, 414 
U.S. at 585 n.17. In theory, loss of society damages under general maritime law 
compensate for losses that would be awarded in a land based tort law action un-
der loss of consortium, and include amounts for deprivation of the decedent's exis-
tence generally. See id. at 585. Therefore, a claim for loss of society is substantial-
ly the same as one for loss of consortium. Nichols v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 
17 F.3d 119, 122 n.4 (5th Cir. 1994). For clarity, this comment will use the term 
embraced by admiralty courts, loss of society. 
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men5 killed in territorial waters6 regardless of whether the 
5. Seamen have special status in admiralty and maritime law: a seaman is 
one who is employed on a vessel and whose duties contribute to the accomplish-
ment of the vessel's mission. McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 355 
(1991). The decedents in Earles II were passengers in a pleasure craft, and thus 
were not seamen. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 915. 
Seaman status is primarily a statutory privilege which, among other things, 
allows the claimant to take advantage of certain substantive aspects of maritime 
law which differ from traditional tort law. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988) (section 
688 is referred to as "the Jones Act"). First, under the Jones Act, the defendant-
employer owes a seaman a higher duty of care, the so called "featherweight stan-
dard" of liability, the standard for breach is "the slightest negligence." Simeon v. 
T. Smith & Son, Inc., 852 F.2d 1421, 1430 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 
1106 (1989). Second, under the Jones Act a seaman may recover under a more 
lenient standard of proximate cause which merely requires that the defendant-
employer's negligence contributed "in the slightest degree" to the injury or death. 
Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 523 (1957). 
A seaman also has a right to recover under the general maritime law for 
any unseaworthiness of the vessel which caused his accident. Mitchell v. Trawler 
Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 549 (1960). This action does not require proof of negli-
gence by the seaman's employer, rather it requires proof that the vessel or appur-
tenance was not reasonably fit for its intended purpose and there was a causal 
connection between this and the seaman's injury or death. [d. at 550. Under the 
unseaworthiness theory, recovery is akin to strict liability and the lenient Jones 
Act standard of proof does not apply. [d. at 549. Such examples of preferential 
treatment toward seamen are common in admiralty jurisdiction and are justified 
by the policy of "special solicitude." See Harden v. Gordon, 11 F.Cas. 480, 483 
(C.C.D. Me. 1823). See generally SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3, § 5-1 at 158 (noting 
that seamen have access to special remedies not awarded others under the law of 
admiralty). 
In the words of Justice Joseph' Story, the rationale for providing seamen 
special solicitude, admiralty law's greatest protection, is: 
[to effectuate the] public policy of preserving [seamen] for 
the commercial service and maritime defence of the na-
tion. Every act of legislation which secures their 
healths, ... is as wise in policy, as it is just in obliga-
tion. Even the merchant himself derives an ultimate bene-
fit from what may seem at first an onerous charge. It 
encourages seamen to engage in perilous voyages with 
more promptitude. . . . 
Harden, 11 F.Cas. at 483 (noting that elements of the principle of "special solici-
tude" to seamen are present in the laws of most principal maritime nations and 
can, in Anglo-American jurisprudence, be traced back to the medieval sea code, the 
Rolls of Oleron). See also Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 577; Moragne v. States Marine 
Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 386-88 (1970). 
6. Territorial waters are that portion of the sea that extends out three nauti-
cal miles (one maritime league) from the coast line of a state, and over which 
that state exercises sovereignty. See RENE DE KERCHOVE, INTERNATIONAL MARI-
TIME DICTIONARY 828 (D. Van Norstrand Co., 2d ed. 1961). In contrast, the high 
seas are that continuous body of navigable salt water that lies outside territorial 
waters and the maritime lines of demarcation of various nations. [d. at 371-72. It 
should be noted that for purposes of international law of the sea, the "territorial 
3
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parents were financial dependents of the decedents.7 The court 
held that the non-dependent parents of decedents killed in an 
allision8 between a pleasure craft and a Navy mooring buoy 
could recover for loss of society.9 The court reasoned that the 
financial dependency requirement, used by the Second, Fifth 
and Sixth CircuitslO when deciding whether to award loss of 
society in maritime wrongful death actions, was inconsistent 
with the humanitarian policy of providing extended remedies 
to those who bring suit in admiralty jurisdiction.ll The Ninth 
Circuit's reasoning de-emphasizes the importance of fashioning 
uniform recovery between maritime wrongful death actions 
that are brought solely under general maritime law and those 
brought under the federal maritime statutory scheme.12 
sea" of the United States has been extended to twelve nautical miles. Proclama· 
tion No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (1988). This definition of the territorial sea, how· 
ever, is distinct from territorial waters for maritime wrongful death purposes, and 
does not affect admiralty jurisdiction generally. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3, § 
2·1 at 20; 1 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 141, at 9·3 (7th ed. 1988). 
7. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 920. 
8. An allision is, in maritime terminology, the striking of a moving vessel 
against a stationary object. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 75 (6th ed. 1990). 
9. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914·17. 
10. Id. at 916·17, 916 n.14. See Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, 
Ltd., 4 F.3d 1084, 1090·93 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1060 (1994); 
Anderson v. Whittaker Corp., 894 F.2d 804, 811·12 (6th Cir. 1990) (both holding 
that the non·dependent parents of non·seamen killed in territorial waters could not 
recover loss of society damages under general maritime law); Miles v. Melrose, 882 
F.2d 976, 989 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the non·dependent parent of a seaman 
killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages under general 
maritime law), affd sub nom. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990). See 
also Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., No. 93·7490, 1994 WL 685690, at 
*3·4 (2d Cir. Dec. 5, 1994); Air Disaster at Lockerbie Scotland on December 21, 
1988, 37 F.3d 804, 828·30 (2d Cir. 1994) (both holding that federal maritime law 
does not allow recovery for loss of society to non.dependent family members). Cf. 
Walker v. Braus, 861 F. Supp. 527, 531·38 (E.D. La. 1994) (holding by direction of 
the Fifth Circuit that the family members of a non·seaman killed in territorial 
waters could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime law), 
remand before decision, 995 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1993). 
11. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 916·17. 
12. Id. at 917. Maritime wrongful death law is governed by three separate 
causes of action, two statutory, and one court·made: (1) the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 
app. § 688 (1988); (2) the Death on the High Seas Act, "DOHSA," 46 U.S.C. app. 
§§ 761·68 (1988); and (3) a "Moragne action," Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 
U.S. 375 (1970) (creating a court·made wrongful death action in the general mario 
time law). See generally SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3, § 7·1 at 235·36 (noting that a 
"crazy quilt pattern" of wrongful death actions is recognized in admiralty jurisdic· 
tion). 
4
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The Ninth Circuit's holding extends loss of society damag-
es under general maritime law to the non-financially depen-
dent parents of non-seamen who perish within territorial wa-
ters, despite a recent United States Supreme Court decision13 
which affirmed the importance of uniformity14 by declining to 
award loss of society damages to the non-dependent mother of 
a seaman killed in territorial waters.15 
This comment compares the Ninth Circuit's holding with 
the approaches other courts have taken regarding loss of soci-
ety damages and the dependency rule for awarding such recov-
ery in maritime wrongful death actions. This comment cort-
eludes that, although the Ninth Circuit's decision was an em-
pathetic attempt at developing the law of maritime damages, 
the holding's glaring conflict with the spirit of the maritime 
remedial statutory scheme is exemplary of a growing problem 
in maritime law. Specifically, as judges struggle to keep the 
rules of admiralty current with common law developments 
outside the maritime context, the separation of judge-made 
doctrine from Congressional policy widens within admiralty 
jurisdiction, thereby creating new and greater anomalies in 
admiralty uniformity, more uncertainty for admiralty practitio-
ners, and unfair results for some maritime tort victims. 16 
13. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 30-33 (1990) (holding that the 
parent of a seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society 
damages). 
14. The seminal decision explaining the need for uniformity in general mari-
time law stressed that application of this principal rises to the level of a Constitu-
tional mandate. See The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1874). In The 
Lottawanna, the Supreme Court announced: 
One thing, however is unquestionable: The Constitution 
must have referred to a system of law co-extensive with 
and operating uniformly in the whole country. It certainly 
could not have been the intent to place the Rules and 
limits of maritime law under the disposal and regulation 
of the several States, as that would have defeated the 
uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution 
aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting 
the intercourse of the States with each other or with 
foreign States. 
The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 575. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
15. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 917; see Miles, 498 U.S. at 30-33. 
16. See Lizabeth L. Burrell, Current Problems in Maritime Uniformity, 5 U.S.F. 
MAR L.J. 67, 82 (1992) (noting that when mainstream developments are incorpo-
rated into maritime law creating persistent conflicts in uniformity and clashes 
with settled admiralty tenets, the Supreme Court must lead the way). 
5
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On October 28, 1984, at approximately 3:00 a.m., a twen-
ty-foot long jet powered ski boat, the WHISKEY RUNNER, en-
tered a channel designated for recreational boats inside the 
United States Naval Weapons Station at Seal Beach, Hunting-
ton Harbor, California.17 Nine people were aboard the WHIS-
KEY RUNNER when it entered the channel traveling between 
40 and 45 miles per hour.18 Seconds later, the boat headed 
outside the marked channel and struck "Oscar 8,"19 an unillu-
minated Navy mooring buoy.20 The WHISKEY RUNNER sank 
immediately.21 Five of the passengers died on impact; the re-
maining four occupants sustained personal injuries.22 One of 
the survivors was Virl Earles, the operator of the WHISKEY 
RUNNER.23 A blood alcohol test administered to Virl Earles 
several hours after the incident revealed a blood alcohol level 
of .11%.24 
17. Earles v. United States ("Earles I"), 935 F.2d 1028, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(per Leavy, J, with whom Browning, J., joined; Pregerson, J., dissenting), appeal 
after remand, Sutton v. Earles ("Earles II"), 26 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 1994) (per 
Canby, J.; the other panel members were Tang, J., and Beezer, J.). 
18. Earles I, 935 F.2d at 1030. The local speed limit was between 3 and 8 
knots. Id. A knot is the unit of speed used in navigation which is the rate of one 
nautical mile per hour. 1 NATHANIEL BOWDITCH, AMERICAN PRACTICAL NAVIGATOR 
63 (Defense Mapping Agency HydrographirlI'opographic Center, 1984) (1802). One 
nautical mile equals 6,076 ft.., and one statute mile is 5,280 ft.., therefore, the 
speed limit in the harbor was roughly 5 miles per hour. See id. Since the WHIS-
KEY RUNNER was traveling between 40 and 45 miles per hour, the boat was 
moving at approximately 37 knots. See id. Therefore, the WHISKEY RUNNER was 
traveling at an excessive speed at the time of the allision. Earles I, 935 F.2d at 
1030; see supra note 8 for a definition of allision. 
19. Earles I, 935 F.2d at 1030. "Oscar 8," the mooring buoy the WHISKEY 
RUNNER allided with, was a steel white Navy buoy twelve feet in diameter and 
riding approximately five feet above the water. Opening brief for Appellee at 6-7, 
Sutton v. Earles ("Earles II"), 26 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 1994) (No. 92-55548). The 
buoy was located approximately 300 yards inside the harbor and about 250 feet 
outside the navigation channel. Id. One of eight identical buoys placed outside of 
the channel and used to moor ammunition barges, Oscar 8 had no light, beacon, 
or reflective tape. Id. 




24. Id. Although a blood alcohol content of .11% is in excess of the amount at 
which an automobile driver would be considered legally drunk in most states, at 
the time of this accident, no such law applied to the operator of a vessel. See 
Opening brief for Appellant at 9, Earles 11 (No. 92-55548). However, as a result of 
6
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Actions were brought on behalf of the five decedents under 
the Suits in Admiralty Act25 (hereinafter "SIAA") against the 
United States Government for negligence.26 The plaintiffs al-
leged that the Government failed to warn of an obstruction to 
navigation because Oscar 8 was not illuminated and the speed 
limit inside the harbor was not adequately posted.27 The Unit-
ed States impleaded Virl Earles, pursuant to Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 14(c),2S alleging that he was the sole 
cause of the accident and was therefore directly liable to the 
petitioners.29 The five consolidated cases for wrongful death, 
against the United States and Mr. Earles, were bifurcated for 
hearing on the issues of liability and damages.so 
The trial court ruled that the Government and Mr. Earles 
this tragic occurrence, Virl Earles was convicted in the West Orange County Mu-
nicipal Court on five counts of manslaughter and was sentenced to prison. See 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for Appellant at 11, Earles II 
(No. 92-55548). 
25. 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (1988). The Suits in Admiralty Act (hereinafter SIM) 
is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity whereby the federal government con-
sents to negligence liability in admiralty "in cases where . . . if a private person 
or property were involved, a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained." 46 
U.S.C. § 742. To illustrate the scope of the Earles II decision, it should be noted 
that the government's liability arose as a private party's would, i.e., the existence 
of a duty by the United States in Earles II is not due to its sovereignty. See id. 
(emphasis added). The Earles II damages rule would likely apply under similar 
facts to a corporation that maintains private buoys or other such maritime struc-
tures as part of its commercial operations, or a citizen who owns a dock that ex-
tends over navigable waters. See Perlman v. Valdes, 575 So. 2d 216, 217 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (parents of woman who died from injuries sustained when 
speedboat in which she was a passenger struck unlighted, unused concrete pier 
brought maritime wrongful death action against the pier owner, a real estate 
trust); Complaint of Nobles, 842 F. Supp. 1430, 1432 (N.D. Fla. 1993) (involving 
wrongful death of a ski boat passenger who died when the boat he was aboard 
struck a privately owned boathouse). 
26. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 906. 
27. See id. 
28. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 14(c), permits a defendant in admi-
ralty and maritime jurisdiction to act as a third-party plaintiff for the purpose of 
impleading a third-party defendant who may be partially or fully liable directly to 
the original plaintiff. FEn. R. CIV. P. 14(c). The practice is unique to maritime law 
in that the original action proceeds "as if the plaintiff had commenced [the action) 
against the third-party defendant." [d. Thus, the third-party defendant in admiral-
ty jurisdiction may be directly liable to the original plaintiff, not merely liable for 
indemnity to the third-party plaintiff as is normally the practice. [d. 
29. Earles 1, 935 F.2d at 1030; Opening brief for Appellant at 2, Earles II (No. 
92-55548). 
30. Earles 1, 935 F.2d at 1030. 
7
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were equally responsible for the accident.31 After the trial on 
wrongful death damages,32 judgment was entered awarding 
the non-dependent parents of the decedents substantial recov-
ery for loss of society.33 The Government appealed the issues 
of liability and damages.34 
31. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 907. This case was before the Ninth Circuit on ap-
peal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California. 
James M. Ideman, District Judge, Presiding. Opening brief for Appellant at 2-3, 
Earles II (No. 92-55548). Argued and submitted March 17, 1988 in Los Angeles, 
California. Id. 
32. A damages trial was held in the district court on April 12th and 13th, 
1988. Opening brief for Appellant at 3, Earles II (No. 92-55548). 
33. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 915. In addition to amounts awarded for loss of sup-
port, total damages for loss of society awarded by the district court were 
$1,089,900.00, or 49% of the entire judgment, $2,206,091.19. See Opening brief for 
Appellant at 5, Earles II (No. 92-55548); Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law for Appellant at 7-11, Earles II (No. 92-55548). 
34. Earles II, 26 F.2d at 906. Although the District Court found the govern-
ment and Mr. Earles equally at fault, because there was no likelihood of recovery 
from Mr. Earles (above that awarded as off-set from his award against the govern-
ment), the beneficiaries' only effort to pursue their remedies was against the gov-
ernment which was held jointly and severally liable for the total judgment of 
$2,206,091.19. Opening brief for Appellant at 5, Earles II (No. 92-55548). Thus, the 
government alone appealed. Earles 1, 935 F.2d at 1030. The government contested 
liability by arguing that the Discretionary Function Exception that is specifically 
enunciated in the Federal Torts Claim Act also applied to the SIAA. Earles II, 26 
F.3d at 906; Earles 1, 935 F.2d at 1030-32. The Federal Torts Claim Act (hereinaf-
ter "FTCA") is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity whereby the federal govern-
ment consents to negligence liability for damage or loss of property, or negligence 
or death arising from the negligent wrongful acts or omissions of all federal em-
ployees acting within the scope of their employment. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2679(b), 2679(d) 
(1988). Essentially, the FTCA is to land-based law, as the SIAA is to admiralty 
and maritime law, however, the SIAA does not expressly immunize the govern-
ment for the exercise of discretionary functions. Earles 1, 935 F.2d at 1031 (quot-
ing Sheridan Transp. Co. v. United States, 897 F.2d 795, 798 n.2 (5th Cir. 1990». 
The Discretionary Function Exception is a qualification to the general waiver of 
sovereign immunity granted by the Federal Torts Claim Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) 
(1988). The statutory exception states, in pertinent part, that a claim cannot be 
maintained against the United States when the claim is "based upon the exercise 
or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or 
duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether 
or not the discretion involved be abused." Id. The exception is grounded in concern 
for keeping separation of powers intact when sovereign immunity is waived, be-
cause when the government is sued, government conduct necessarily comes under 
judicial scrutiny. Kennewick Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 880 F.2d 1018, 1021-
22 (9th Cir. 1989). Thus, the legislative rationale for the exception is that "Con-
gress wished to prevent judicial 'second-guessing' of legislative and administrative 
decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of 
an action in tort." Earles 1, 935 F.2d at 1031 (quoting United States v. S.A. 
Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 467 U.S. 797, 813-14 (1984». The Ninth 
Circuit in Earles 1 agreed with the government on the application of the Discre-
8
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The Ninth Circuit considered the appeal in Earles v. Unit-
ed States35 ("Earles F') and remanded on the issue of govern-
ment liability without reaching the question of damages.36 On 
remand, the district court amended its original judgment, once 
more finding the United States liable.37 Therefore, in Earles II 
the United States renewed its appeal on the issues of liability 
and damages, asserting that consistent with the spirit of a 
recent Supreme Court decision38 the non-dependent parents of 
non-seamen could not recover for loss of society.39 
III. BACKGROUND 
Loss of society damages are those damages in a maritime 
wrongful death action which compensate the decedent's benefi-
ciary for deprivation of the decedent's continued existence, 
including: love, affection, care, attention, companionship, com-
fort, and protection.40 Loss of society damages are a non-pecu-
niary41 element of maritime wrongful death recovery.42 The 
tionary Function Exception to the SIAA. Earles I, 935 F.2d at 1032; see also 
Earles II, 26 F.3d at 906 (noting that every circuit but one that has considered 
the question has read the exception into the SIAA). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit 
vacated the district court's finding of liability and remanded for a determination of 
whether the Navy's decisions, including, not to adequately post a speed limit and 
not to illuminate Oscar 8, were discretionary policy acts that fell within the Dis-
cretionary Function Exception barring recovery. Earles I, 935 F.2d at 1032; see 
also Earles II, 26 F.3d at 906. 
35. Earles v. United States ("Earles I"), 935 F.2d 1028, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 
1991), appeal after remand, Sutton v. Earles ("Earles II"), 26 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 
1994). 
36. Earles I, 935 F.2d at 1032. 
37. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 906 n.1. 
38. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 30-33 (1990) (holding that the 
parent of a seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society 
damages under general maritime law). 
39. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-15. 
40. Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 585 (1974). 
41. Pecuniary damages are recovery for loss that can be estimated and com-
pensated in money. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 392 (6th ed. 1990). Pecuniary dam-
ages may include amounts for depravation, injury, loss of rights, or other loss that 
can be calculated or recompensed in money. Id. Admiralty courts, however, gener-
ally hold that pecuniary damages are that amount for loss of money or salable 
property by the plaintiff for which compensation is awarded. See Miles v. Apex 
Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32-33 (1990). Thus, admiralty courts hold that under 
the general maritime law, loss of society damages are non-pecuniary in nature. 
Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 583-91 (emphasis added). 
42. Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 585 n.17. 
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doctrine entered admiralty through the case of Sea-Land Ser-
vices v. Gaudet,43 a longshoreman case,44 wherein the Su-
preme Court reasoned that extending elements of damages for 
non-pecuniary loss would align maritime wrongful death law 
with the majority of state wrongful death statutes that at that 
time allowed recovery for non-pecuniary loss.45 Furthermore, 
the Court reasoned that its rationale was in accord with the 
well settled admiralty tenet of "special solicitude. "46 
Special solicitude is an ancient tenet of the maritime law 
of seamen based on both humanitarian and economic policy.47 
Special solicitude treats seamen as the "wards of admiralty," 
protecting them from the harsh conditions of their employ-
ment, and in so doing, encourages seagoing to the ultimate 
benefit of commerce.48 Courts applying the doctrine of special 
solicitude must balance it against another maritime law princi-
ple, that of uniformity.49 
The doctrine of uniformity is the fundamental constitution-
43. 414 U.S. 573, 585-90 (1974) (holding the spouse of a longshoreman killed 
in territorial waters could recover loss of society damages under general maritime 
law). 
44. At the time of this case, longshoremen, under the doctrine of "Sieracki 
seaman," were extended protection under the general maritime law pursuant to 
the same heightened standard of liability seamen derived from "special solicitude." 
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. at 85, 99 (1946), reh'g denied, 328 U.S. 
878 (1946). A "Sieracki seaman" was granted seaman-type privileges, because 
courts reasoned, in their employment, longshoremen face analogous hazards as do 
seamen and, like seamen, perform a function essential to maritime service aboard 
ships. [d. Today however, that doctrine has been abolished by the 1972 amend-
ments to the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, which gives mari-
time shore workers, such as longshoremen, federal statutory remedies. 44 Stat. 
1424 (1927) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1988». 
45. Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 587-88. 
46. ld. at 588. 
47. Harden v. Gordon, 11 F.Cas. 480, 483 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (noting that the 
principle of "special solicitude" is based on both protecting the generally improvi-
dent class of seamen and preserving it for the commercial service of the nation, 
and moreover that the doctrine could be traced back to the medieval sea code, the 
Rolls of Oleron). See also Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 577; Moragne v. States Marine 
Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 386-88 (1970); see supra note 5 for a discussion on special 
solicitude. 
48. Harden, 11 F.Cas. at 483. 
49. See Lizabeth L. Burrell, Current Problems in Maritime Uniformity, 5 U.S.F. 
MAR L.J. 67, 165 (1992) (noting that without uniformity, maritime practice would 
be unmanageable). 
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al principle defining federal admiralty jurisdiction, while en-
trusting to the district courts the power to develop maritime 
law in harmony with each other.50 To ensure uniformity of 
law the Constitution places admiralty and maritime cases in 
federal court jurisdiction. 51 Application of the uniformity prin-
ciple assures that maritime rules of decision are developed con-
sistently throughout the nation so that federal policy regarding 
marine transportation is implemented on a federal scale, there-
by complementing the federal government's power to regulate 
commerce.52 Uniformity is especially important to admiralty 
practitioners because it assures reliability and predictability of 
the governing law regardless of where a client's vessel travels 
or where a maritime tort arises.53 Federal control of maritime 
law is thus important because otherwise the transient nature 
of vessel operations and the remote sites of maritime ventures 
would frustrate the constitutional mandate.54 Because mari-
time wrongful death recovery developed in reaction to immedi-
ate concerns, various causes of actions exist that incorporate 
liabilities or impose damages differently from each other, pro-
ducing a scheme of recovery wherein the constitutional princi-
ple is threatened.55 
50. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 
Wall.) at 573-75; Lizabeth L. Burrell, Current Problems in Maritime Uniformity, 5 
U.S.F. MAR L.J. 67, 88 (1992) (noting that uniformity is at the heart of the dis-
trict courts' grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction); supra note 14 for a 
discussion on uniformity. 
It should be noted that although the general maritime law is federal law, 
state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over some maritime actions and thus may 
apply federal maritime rules of decision (the "general maritime law"), when appro-
priate, under the "saving to suitors" clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789 as codified 
today in 28 U.S.C. § 1333. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988). A state court must apply 
general maritime law rules when in conflict with state law in order to preserve 
uniformity of the general maritime law despite its application across many juris-
dictional forums. Southern Pacific v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917); see also 
Nelson" v. United States, 639 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1980). 
51. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
52. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This clause, commonly referred to as the 
"Commerce Clause," allocates the power to regulate commerce to the federal gov-
ernment. See The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 573-75; see also Jensen, 244 
U.S. at 216. 
53. See Lizabeth L. Burrell, Current Problems in Maritime Uniformity, 5 U.S.F. 
MAR L.J. 67, 165 (1992). 
54. [d. 
55. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 26-27 (1990) (noting that 
admiralty courts that "supplement" statutory remedies in maritime wrongful death 
actions must to so to achieve uniform vindication of national policy); see also Mobil 
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Maritime wrongful death law is principally governed by 
three separate causes of action, two statutory, and one court-
made.56 First, under the Jones Act, beneficiaries may recover 
for maritime wrongful death of a seaman from the seaman's 
employer regardless of where the seaman's death occurred.57 
Second, recovery for wrongful death occurring further than 
three nautical miles from shore is governed by The Death on 
the High Seas Act (hereinafter "DOHSA,,).58 Third, claims 
made for wrongful death of non-seamen in state territorial 
waters (within three nautical miles from shore), may be 
brought under the general maritime law in what is commonly 
known as a "Moragne action."59 
A. THE DEATH ON THE HIGH SEAS ACT AND THE JONES ACT: 
FEDERAL STATUTORY CAUSES OF ACTION FOR MARITIME 
WRONGFUL DEATH 
In 1886, the Supreme Court decided The Harrisburg,60 
which incorporated into American maritime jurisprudence the 
common law rule that "a tort action dies with its possessor.,,61 
The Court in The Harrisburg held that, absent a statutory 
provision, no cause of action for wrongful death existed in 
general maritime law.62 Consistent with The Harrisburg, but 
in an effort to mitigate its harsh rule, the Supreme Court in 
1907 decided The Hamilton.63 In The Hamilton, the Court 
reasoned that, because no federal statute provided a remedy 
for maritime wrongful death at that time, general maritime 
Oil v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978) (noting that since Congres8 has 
never enacted a comprehensive maritime code, courts that award maritime wrong-
ful death damages must do so in a way that preserves the uniformity of maritime 
law). See generally THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAw § 7-1, 
at 235 (1987 & Supp. 1992) (noting "a crazy quilt pattern" of wrongful death ac-
tions is recognized in admiralty that was "jerry-built" on an ad-hoc basis over 
many years of response to immediate concerns). 
56. See supra note 12. 
57. 41 Stat. 988, 1007 (1920) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 
(1988». 
. 58. 41 Stat. 537 (1920) (codified at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-68 (1988». 
59. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970). 
60. 119 U.S. 199 (1886), overruled by Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 
U.S. 375 (1970). 
61. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 204-05 (1886). 
62. [d. at 213. 
63. 207 U.S. 398 (1907). 
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law could borrow state wrongful death statutes to provide 
recovery to beneficiaries of maritime fatalities.64 However, two 
limitations were placed on beneficiaries who asserted maritime 
wrongful death claims after The Hamilton: (1) not all states' 
wrongful death statutes contemplated maritime fatalities when 
they were enacted, and therefore, some states did not create a 
right of action; and (2) even if the state created a claim, if the 
maritime fatality did not take place within state territorial 
waters where the statute had jurisdictional effect, no recovery 
was available.65 Therefore, after The Harrisburg and The 
Hamilton, recovery for wrongful death in general maritime law 
was piecemeal in territorial waters, and non-existent on the 
high seas.66 
In 1920 Congress enacted DOHSA67 to preempt The Har-
risburg and create a negligence based wrongful death action 
for beneficiaries of "anyone" killed on the high seas.66 In the 
same year, Congress enacted The Jones Act,69 which also cre-
ated a maritime negligence based wrongful death action, but 
only for the beneficiaries of a "seaman.,,70 
64. The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398, 403·06 (1907). 
65. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 393 n.10. (1970); see 
supra note 6 and accompanying text for a definition of territorial waters. 
66. Moragne, 398 U.S. 393 n.lO; see THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND 
MARITIME LAw § 7·1, at 235 (1987 & Supp. 1992); see also GRANT GILMORE AND 
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY, § 6·29, at 359 (2nd ed. 1975). 
67. 41 Stat. 537 (1920) (codified at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761·68 (1988». 
68. [d. The Death on the High Seas Act !hereinafter "DOHSA"] states, in 
pertinent part: 
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by 
wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high 
seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any 
State, . . . the personal representatives of the decedent 
may maintain a suit for damages in the district courts of 
the United States, in admiralty .... 
[d. (emphasis added); see supra note 3 for an explanation of the preemptive effect 
Congressional enactments have on the general maritime law. 
69. 41 Stat. 988, 1007 (1920) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 
(1988». 
70. [d. When drafting the Jones Act, Congress did not formulate a unique 
cause of action for seamen, but merely adopted, wholesale, the wrongful death 
action that existed for railroad employees under the Federal Employers' Liability 
Acts, 33 U.S.C. §§ 51·59 !hereinafter "FELA"I. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 
U.S. 19, 33 (1990). The Jones Act states, in pertinent part: "[Am statutes of the 
United States modifying or extending the common·law right or remedy in cases 
of ... [wrongful deathl to railroad employees shall apply .... " 46 U.S.C. app. § 
13
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With regard to wrongful death actions, the Jones Act dif-
fers from DOHSA in three major respects.71 First, beneficia-
ries asserting a Jones Act claim must establish seaman status 
of the decedent as a prerequisite for recovery, while DOHSA 
covers wrongful death regardless of status.72 Second, Jones 
Act beneficiaries recover for wrongful death whether the tort 
occurred in territorial waters or on the high seas, while 
DORSA governs only on the high seas.73 Third, DORSA al-
lows recovery for financial loss to all relatives who were depen-
dent on the decedent, while under the Jones Act's schedule of 
beneficiaries, claimants take by class.74 When a prior class 
has already recovered, members of a subsequent class are 
precluded from recovering.7S Therefore, in the case where a 
member of a prior class has already recovered under the Jones 
Act, the member of a subsequent class may be denied recovery, 
even if financially dependent.76 Notwithstanding the inconsis-
tencies between statutes, the intent behind each was similar, 
to abrogate the harsh results of The Harrisburg, and thereby 
affect a federal policy of encouraging recovery for maritime 
wrongful death.77 However, maritime wrongful death recovery 
under both federal maritime remedial statutes is limited to 
688 (1988). See supra note 5 for a discussion on seaman status. 
71. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988); 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-78 (1988). See also 
GILMORE AND BLACK, supra note 66, §§ 6-29 to 6-31. 
72. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988); 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-68 (1988). See 
supra note 5 for a discussion on seaman status. 
73. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988); 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-68 (1988). 
74. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988); 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-68 (1988). 
Section 761 of DORSA states, in pertinent part: "for the exclusive benefit of 
the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative .... " 46 U.S.C. 
app. § 761. 
Section 51 of FELA, which is incorporated into the Jones Act by reference 
in 46 U.S.C. app. § 688, states in pertinent part: "for the benefit of the surviving 
widow or husband and children of such employee; -and, if none, then of such em-
ployees parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employ-
ee. . . ." 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988) (emphasis added). Therefore, in the case where a 
decedent seaman's spouse recovers under the Jones Act, the seaman's parent(s), 
even if dependent, are barred from recovering. See GILMORE AND BLACK, supra 
note 66, § 6-30, at 360-62 (2nd ed. 1975). 
75. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988). See GILMORE AND BLACK, supra note 66, § 6-
30, at 360-62 (2nd ed. 1975). 
76. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988). See GILMORE AND BLACK, supra note 66, § 6-
30, at 360-62 (2nd ed. 1975). 
77. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914. See 41 Stat. 537 (1920) (codified at 46 U.S.C. 
app. §§ 761-68 (1988»; 41 Stat. 988, 1007 (1920) (codified as amended at 46 
U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988». 
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damages for pecuniary loss.78 
In enacting the maritime remedial statutory scheme, Con-
gress reasoned that although recovery for wrongful death in 
territorial waters might still vary among jurisdictions, state 
statutes provided adequate remedies to non-seamen, and thus 
Congress did not extend coverage to non-seamen under 
DORSA, into territorial waters.79 The Jones Act, however, 
was also enacted as part of the Merchant Marine . Act of 
1920,80 which had the purpose of promoting a strong and via-
ble American merchant marine to facilitate interstate and 
foreign commerce as well as to respond to national emergen-
cies.81 Thus, Congress covered seamen both on the high seas 
and in state territorial waters, reasoning that seamen were a 
class of industrial workers entitled to "special solicitude" for 
the harsh conditions of their employment, and that protecting 
seamen from the incomplete recovery afforded under state law 
78. Section 762 of DORSA states, in pertinent part: "The recovery in such suit 
shall be a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained by the per-
sons for whose benefit the suit is brought .... " 46 U.S.C. app. § 762 (emphasis 
added). In contrast, the Jones Act's limitation on pecuniary damages is not explic-
it, but incorporated by legislative intent from FELA, on which it is based. Miles, 
498 U.S. 19, 33 (1990). In tum, FELA is based on the original wrongful death 
statute, Lord Campbell's Act, which, as a well settled judicial matter, limits recov-
ery to pecuniary damages only. Id.; see supra note 41 for a definition of pecuniary 
damages. 
79. R.R. REP. No. 10378, 66th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1920). 
80. 41 Stat. 988 (1920). The maritime injury and wrongful death provision 
commonly known as the Jones Act is found in the miscellaneous provisions section 
of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 which collectively is titled "An Act To Provide 
For The Promotion And Maintenance Of The American Merchant Marine .... " Id. 
The first provision of the Act states: 
Id. 
[lIt is necessary for the national defense and for the prop-
er growth of its foreign and domestic commerce that the 
United States shall have a merchant marine of the best 
equipped [personnel) and most suitable types of vessels 
sufficient to carry the greater portion of its commerce and 
serve as a naval . . . auxiliary in time of war or national 
emergency . . . and it is hereby declared to be the policy 
of the United States to do whatever may be necessary to 
develop and encourage the maintenance of . . . a mer-
chant marine. . . . 
81. 41 Stat. 988 (1920); see supra notes 5, 47-48 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the dual humanitarian and economic policy underlying this legisla-
tion; see also GILMORE AND BLACK, supra note 66, § 11-5, at 965-66 (noting provi-
sions of the act were designed to "foster shipping"). 
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would be consistent with the principle of special solicitude and 
encourage employment at sea.82 
B. THE DOCTRINE OF UNSEAWORTHINESS: GENERAL MARITIME 
LAw THEORY OF LIABILITY WITHOUT FAULT 
Along with Congressional enactment of the federal mari-
time wrongful death statutes, the Supreme Court has devel-
oped an alternative theory of liability under general maritime 
law to further the policy of recovery for maritime torts, the 
doctrine of unseaworthiness.8s The doctrine of unseaworthi-
ness is similar to strict liability,84 and therefore favors recov-
ery.85 In the years following enactment of the maritime reme-
dial statutory scheme, it became common practice in maritime 
wrongful death cases for beneficiaries of a seaman to join their 
Jones Act negligence claims with either a state wrongful death 
claim based on the theory of unseaworthiness, if the death 
occurred in state territorial waters, or a DOHSA claim founded 
on unseaworthiness, if the death occurred on the high seas.86 
However, in 1964, the Supreme Court in Gillespie v. United 
82. H.R. REP. No. 10378, 66th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1920). 
83. See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960) (holding that 
under general maritime law the owner of a vessel is held to an implied warranty 
that the vessel is reasonably fit for its intended use, and that that duty is inde-
pendent of the shipowner's duty of reasonable care under the Jones Act); see also 
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S 85, 94 (1946) (holding that unseaworthiness 
may be maintained in a warranty claim and is a species of liability without fault). 
reh'g denied, 328 U.S. 878 (1946); Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co .• 348 U.S. 336, 
340 (1955) (holding that the warranty of seaworthiness extends to unfit 
crewmembers analogizing that crewmembers are equally as vital to safety aboard 
ship as a seaworthy hull); Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 101-02 
(1944) (holding that the shipowner's duty of seaworthiness is absolute and non-
delegable). The doctrine of unseaworthiness has its incubus in the proposition that 
shipowners are liable for seamen's injuries that are caused by the unseaworthiness 
of their vessel, or the failure to keep their vessel supplied with the proper fix-
tures. See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903). 
84. In tort law, strict liability is liability without fault that is imposed on one 
who engages is an activity that involves inherent risk of injury. W. PAGE KEETON 
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 75, at 534-38 (5th ed. 1984). The ratio-
nale of the tort law of strict liability is to discourage socially dangerous behavior. 
while not entirely prohibiting any social benefit such behavior may have. [d. The 
maritime law warranty of seaworthiness serves to discourage shipowners from 
exacerbating the inherent risks of seagoing, while not prohibiting the social benefit 
of marine operations. See Sieracki. 328 U.S. at 108. 
85. See Sieracki, 328 U.S. at 108. 
86. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 399-401 (1970). 
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States Steel Corp.87 held that the Jones Act was the exclusive 
remedy for a seaman's beneficiaries in territorial waters.88 
The Court reasoned that since the Jones Act provided a reme-
dy in territorial waters, it manifested federal maritime policy, 
and therefore it was paramount over state wrongful death 
statutes under the constitutional preference for uniformity.89 
After Gillespie, a seaman's beneficiaries were no longer able to 
bring state claims founded on unseaworthiness for wrongful 
death in territorial water under The Hamilton, but could main-
tain Jones Act claims founded solely on negligence.90 There-
fore, when coupled with the rule of The Harrisburg, Gillespie 
unintentionally effected a more generous remedy to the benefi-
ciaries of some non-seamen than to the beneficiaries of sea-
men, for deaths occurring in territorial waters, in derogation of 
the basic maritime law principle that seamen are entitled to 
"special solicitude."91 By 1970, the overlap of, and gap be-
tween, state wrongful death statutes and the federal maritime 
remedial statutory scheme, coupled with evolving doctrines in 
the general maritime law, such as the doctrine of unseaworthi-
ness, caused anomalies in recovery for wrongful death which 
prompted the Supreme Court's attention.92 
87. 379 u.s. 148 (1964). 
88. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 155 (1964). Cf. 
Bodden v. American Offshore, Inc., 681 F.2d 319, 329 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that 
DORSA provides the exclusive wrongful death remedy for unseaworthiness when a 
seaman is killed outside state territorial waters). 
89. Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 156; see supra notes 14, 49-55 and accompanying 
text for a discussion on uniformity. 
90. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 395-96 n.12. The Court in Gillespie decided that 
the siblings of a deceased seaman could not join a state wrongful death claim 
based on unseaworthiness with their mother's Jones Act wrongful death claim, rea-
soning that the siblings were precluded from recovering under the Jones Act's 
schedule of beneficiaries. Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 155. 
91. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 396 n.12; see supra notes 5, 47-48 and accompanying 
text for a discussion on special solicitude. 
92. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 395-97. 
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C. MORAGNE ACTION: GENERAL MARITIME LAw CAUSE OF 
ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 
1. Special Solicitude: The Humanitarian Policy of General 
Maritime Law 
In Moragne v. States Marine Lines,93 the Supreme Court, 
in a unanimous decision, overturned The Harrisburg and es-
tablished a cause of action for wrongful death in general mari-
time law.94 In Moragne, the wife of a longshoreman96 killed 
in territorial waters brought suit for wrongful death under 
Florida's wrongful death statute asserting negligence and un-
seaworthiness.96 However, because the state wrongful death 
statute did not create an action based on unseaworthiness, and 
according to The Harrisburg no cause of action for negligent 
wrongful death was available when a non-seaman perished in 
territorial waters, the widow was denied relief by the trial 
court and, on appeal, by the Fifth Circuit.97 
The Supreme Court based its decision to overrule The 
Harrisburg, and grant the widow relief, on two principles: (1) 
the need for uniformity in maritime law,98 and (2) the aim to 
provide "special solicitude" to those who bring suit in admiral-
ty.99 The Court noted that after Gillespie, the beneficiaries of 
seamen were provided less protection than the beneficiaries of 
some non-seamen, and that its decision was designed to reme-
dy this anomaly.loo 
93. 398 U.S. 375 (1970). 
94. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 397-409 (1970). 
95. See supra note 44 for a discussion on legal treatment of longshoremen. 
96. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 376. 
97. [d. at 376-77. 
98. See supra notes 14, 49-55 and accompanying text for a discussion on uni-
formity. 
99. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 386-88, 401, 403. It should be noted that a spe-
cies of "special solicitude" applied to the decedent-longshoreman in Moragne, be-
cause at the time of that case courts were extending the warranty of unseaworthi-
ness to longshoremen under the "Sieracki seaman" doctrine. See Seas Shipping Co. 
v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 99 (1946), reh'g denied, 328 U.S. 878 (1946). The sweep-
ing language of the holding in Moragne, however, appeared to extend "special 
solicitude" to "all those who brought suit in admiralty jurisdiction." 
100. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 395-96 n.12. The Court explained: 
The . . . anomaly is that a true seaman - that is, a 
member of a ship's company, covered by the Jones Act -
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After Moragne, recovery for maritime fatalities that oc-
curred in state territorial waters was available to beneficiaries 
of non-seamen in federal court, as it had been for deaths that 
occurred on the high seas under DOHSA.101 Moreover, recov-
ery was consistent regardless of which state's territorial waters 
the tort occurred in, because federal courts applied the general 
maritime law uniformly.102 To provide additional support for 
its departure from stare decisis, the Court reasoned that mari-
time law embodies civil law elements including unique equita-
ble doctrines which grew apart from the common law and 
which supported a general maritime law death remedy.103 
Justice Harlan announced, "a 'special solicitude' for the welfare 
of those [persons] who undertook to venture upon hazardous 
and unpredictable sea voyages. "104 
The recoverable elements of damages and standing to 
recover in the general maritime wrongful death action 
("Moragne action") were not decided. 105 The United States 
Government, as amicus curiae, advocated that DOHSA's sched-
ule of beneficiaries should be adopted for the new cause of ac-
[d. 
is provided no remedy for death caused by unseaworthi-
ness within territorial waters, while a longshoreman, to 
whom the duty of seaworthiness was extended only be-
cause he performs work traditionally done by seamen, 
does have such a remedy when allowed by a state stat-
ute. 
101. [d. at 403. 
102. [d. at 397-403. 
103. [d. at 386-88. Justice Harlan announced: 
Maritime law had always, in this country as in England, 
been a thing apart from the common law. It was, to a 
large extent, administered by different courts; it owed a 
much greater debt to the civil law; and, from its focus on 
a particular subject matter, it developed general principles 
unknown to the common law. These principles included a 
special solicitude for the welfare of those men who under-
took to venture upon hazardous and unpredictable sea 
voyages. 
Moragne, 398 U.S. at 386-88. 
104. [d. Notwithstanding this broad language, Justice Harlan was apparently 
referring to seamen and, at that time, maritime shore-workers. See Sistrunk v. 
Circle Bar Drilling Co., 770 F.2d 455, 460 (5th Cir. 1985), reh'g denied, 775 F.2d 
301 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1019 (1986); Sieracki, 328 U.S. at 99-
100. 
105. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 405-08. 
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tion.106 In addressing the Government's argument, Justice 
Harlan stated, "we think its final resolution should await fur-
ther sifting through the lower courts in future litigation. "107 
Despite its failure to resolve the damages issue, the Supreme 
Court suggested that the lower courts look to existing remedial 
legislation for analytical guidance. 108 Thus, the Supreme 
Court created the possibility that the new maritime wrongful 
death action, which was predicated in part on uniformity, 
might allow non-uniform recovery.109 
In Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet,l1O the Supreme Court 
considered the scope and content of damages in a Moragne 
action. III In a five to four decision, the Court allowed the 
beneficiary of a longshoreman killed in state territorial waters 
to recover loss of society damages. 112 First the Court defined 
"loss of society" as "a broad range of mutual benefits each 
family member receives from the others' continued existence, 
including love, affection, care, attention, companionship, com-
fort, and protection."113 The Court then reasoned that since 
the action was not controlled by statute, the Court was com-
pelled to extend a remedy within general maritime law consis-
tent with the guiding principle announced in Moragne which 
was to show "special solicitude" to the beneficiaries of those 
who are killed within admiralty jurisdiction.1l4 The Court 
106. [d. at 408. 
107. [d. 
108. [d. 
109. See id. 
110. 414 U.S. 573 (1974) (holding that loss of society damages are allowed as 
an element of recovery in a Moragne action for death of a longshoreman in territo-
rial waters). 
111. Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 585-90 (1974). 
112. [d. at 585-90. 
113. [d. at 585. 
114. [d. at 587-88. Because the Court in Gaudet used broad language that did 
not limit loss of society to longshoremen in territorial waters only, many lower 
courts have interpreted the Court's language in Gaudet as extending "special solici-
tude" beyond seamen, to all who bring suit in admiralty jurisdiction. See, e.g., 
Sutton v. Earles ("Earles II"), 26 F.3d 903, 917 (9th Cir. 1994). However, inter-
preting Gaudet to extend solicitude to non-seamen is arguably an over broad read-
ing of that case because the decedent in Gaudet was not merely a "non-seaman," 
but was more precisely a "longshoreman," who at that time courts extended solici-
tude to as a "Sieracki seaman." See Gaudet, 414 U.S .. at 585-90; Sieracki, 328 U.S. 
at 99. Thus, it can be asserted that Gaudet did not extend special solicitude be-
yond the realm of seamen, and therefore, the lower courts that have since done 
20
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recognized that its decision permitted recovery for non-pecuni-
ary damages that were prohibited in statutory maritime cases, 
but reasoned that it was aligning the judge-made maritime 
wrongful death remedy with the majority trend in the United 
States which allowed loss of society by statute.115 Thus, the 
Supreme Court, not constrained by legislation in either 
Moragne or Gaudet, appears to have favored incorporating 
current legal developments outside the realm of maritime law 
into admiralty jurisdiction despite departure from the principle 
of admiralty uniformity.116 Nevertheless, later Supreme Court 
decisions took a tack favoring uniformity.ll7 
2. Uniformity: The Touchstone of General Maritime Law 
In Mobil Oil v. Higginbotham,118 the Supreme Court em-
phasized the traditional desire of the admiralty courts for uni-
formity and noted the potential conflict between the judge-
made Moragne remedy and the remedies provided by Congress 
in the federal maritime statutes.119 In dealing with this con-
flict, the Court declined to award loss of society damages under 
general maritime law to the beneficiary of a longshoreman 
so. misapplied the Supreme Court's holding. See Walker v. Braus. 861 F.Supp. 
527. 533 (E.D. La. 1994) (noting that Miles made it clear that general maritime 
law beneficiaries should receive no more and no less solicitude than Jones Act 
beneficiaries of seamen. and DOHSA beneficiaries of persons killed on the high 
seas. because courts have interpreted Gaudet too broadly by their reliance on the 
sweeping language of Moragne). remand before decision. 995 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 
1993). 
115. Gaudet. 414 U.s. at 587-88 n.22. 
116. See Moragne. 398 U.S. at 390 (noting that the Court's decision to create a 
federal maritime wrongful death action was based in part on the fact that the law 
of every state in the United States had evolved to the point where an action for 
wrongful death existed by statute); Gaudet. 414 U.S. at 587-88 (noting that allow-
ing loss of society into the general maritime law. aligned the general maritime 
wrongful death remedy with the majority of state wrongful death statutes and the 
majority trend in the United States to allow such recovery). 
117. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp .• 498 U.S. 19. 26-27 (1990) (noting that 
admiralty courts that "supplement" statutory remedies in maritime wrongful death 
actions must do so to achieve uniform vindication of national policy); Mobil Oil v. 
Higginbotham. 436 U.S. 618. 625 (1978) (noting that since Congress has never 
enacted a comprehensive maritime code. courts that award maritime wrongful 
death damages must do so in a way that preserves the uniformity of maritime 
law). 
118. 436 U.S. 618 (1978) (holding that loss of society damages are not a remedy 
in a Moragne action for a death that occurred on the high seas). 
119. Mobil Oil v. Higginbotham. 436 U.S. 618. 622-26 (1978). 
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killed on the high seas.120 Because DORSA applied concur-
rently with a Moragne action, and DORSA expressly limits 
damages to pecuniary loss, the Court reasoned it was preclud-
ed by Congressional intent from enhancing statutory recovery 
with the judge-made loss of society remedy.121 The Court rea-
soned that, "[DORSA] does not address every issue of wrong-
ful-death law, ... but when it does speak directly to a ques-
tion, the courts are not free to 'supplement' Congress' answer 
so thoroughly that the Act becomes meaningless."122 Address-
ing the anomaly that Gaudet allowed loss of society damages 
for a death in territorial waters while DORSA did not allow 
non-pecuniary damages for a death on the high seas, the Court 
reasoned that loss of society awards under Gaudet were not a 
major threat to overall uniformity because their propriety 
could be scrutinized if they ever became a "substantial portion 
of the [beneficiary's] recovery. "123 The Supreme Court thus 
endorsed minor disparities between recovery available for 
wrongful death on the high seas and in territorial waters. 124 
In 1990, the Supreme Court employed the analytical 
framework of Higginbotham to decide Miles u. Apex Marine 
Corp.125 Although in Miles the Supreme Court stressed the 
need for uniformity of recovery in maritime actions, the Court 
refused to overrule Gaudet. 126 The Court in Miles limited 
120. [d. By the time Higginbotham was decided in 1978, the general maritime 
law doctrine which extended special solicitude to longshoremen had been abolished 
by the 1972 amendments to the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation 
Act, which gives maritime shore workers, such as longshoremen, federal statutory 
remedies. 44 Stat. 1424 (1927) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 
(1988». 
121. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 622-26. 
122. [d. at 625. 
123. [d. at 624 n.20; see also, W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON 
ON TORTS § 127, at 952 n.81 (5th ed. 1984) (noting that the Supreme Court has 
not yet decided the issue which its dicta in Higginbotham raised, namely whether 
awards for loss of society must be primarily symbolic rather than a substantial 
portion of recovery). 
124. See Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 624 n.20; but cf. KEETON, supra note 123 
(noting that on occasion substantial awards for loss of society have been made in 
jurisdictions allowing such recovery in step with a general trend in American ju-
risprudence toward expanding tort liability). 
125. 498 U.S. 19, 30-33 (1990) (holding that the parent of a seaman killed in 
territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime 
law); Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 622-26. 
126. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 31-32 (1990). 
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Gaudet to its facts announcing, "[t]he holding of Gaudet ap-
plies only in territorial waters, and it applies only to long-
shoremen.,,127 The Supreme Court decided Miles in an effort 
to restore uniformity to the maritime law of seamen.128 
In Miles the Supreme Court held that loss of society is not 
among the elements of damages allowed to the beneficiaries of 
Jones Act seamen in wrongful death actions brought under 
general maritime law for unseaworthiness. 129 The Court de-
nied loss of society to the non-dependent mother of a seaman 
knifed to death by a fellow crewmember onboard the ship on 
which he was employed while the ship lay alongside a berth in 
Washington State territorial waters.130 The Court reasoned 
that recovery for non-pecuniary loss, such as loss of society, 
was foreclosed in a general maritime law wrongful death ac-
tion for death of a seaman, because the Jones Act, which con-
trols recovery for the judicially protected class of seamen, lim-
its recovery to pecuniary 10SS.131 The Court's reasoning em-
phasized that when a Jones Act claim is joined with an over-
127. [d. at 31. 
128. [d. at 37. Justice O'Connor wrote: 
[d. 
Cognizant of the constitutional relationship between the 
courts and Congress, we today act in accordance with the 
uniform plan of maritime tort law Congress created in 
DOHSA and the Jones Act. We hold that there is a gen-
eral maritime cause of action for the wrongful death of a 
seaman, but that damages recoverable in such an action 
do not include loss of society. 
129. [d.; see supra notes 83-85 for a discussion of unseaworthiness. 
130. Miles, 498 U.S. at 37. See generally Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 
U.S. 336, 340 (1955) (holding that in an action against a shipowner for injuries 
resulting from an assault by a fellow crewmember, evidence that the assailant had 
such a savage disposition so as to endanger others working on the ship, that he 
had a propensity for violence greater than that of the ordinary person of that 
calling, and that a crew with assailant as a member was not competent to meet 
the contingencies of a sea voyage, is sufficient to support an action for breach of 
the warranty of seaworthiness). 
131. Miles, 498 U.S. at 32-33. Although the Jones Act does not expressly limit 
damages to pecuniary loss, the Court reasoned, "When Congress passed the Jones 
Act, ... [i]ncorporating FELA ... Congress must have intended to incorporate 
[FELA's] pecuniary limitation on damages as well." [d. Herein the Court missed 
an opportunity to interpret FELA's pecuniary damages limitation out of the Jones 
Act, in line with the policy of special solicitude and evolving doctrines of tort 
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lapping claim under the general maritime law for loss of soci-
ety, uniformity with legislative intent dictates that the Jones 
Act's pecuniary damages limitation preclude recovery for loss 
of society.132 Thus, Moragne-Gaudet and Higginbotham-Miles 
demonstrate how the Supreme Court has struggled to provide 
both special solicitude and uniformity in admiralty while ad-
hering to its own place in the constitutional scheme. 133 
3. Doctrinal Conflict: Special Solicitude Versus Uniformity 
Moragne and Gaudet appear to stand for the proposition 
that the Court will sacrifice uniformity to keep pace with re-
medial developments outside of admiralty jurisdiction when 
not preempted by statute.134 Higginbotham and Miles stand 
for the proposition that when a statute speaks directly to an 
issue, the Court will not sacrifice uniformity between the 
judge-made action and the Congressional enactment to allow 
relief beyond what Congress has dictated. 135 Therefore, as a 
result of the overlap of, and gap between, Congressional enact-
ments and Supreme Court jurisprudence, the issue of whether 
to award loss of society damages to the beneficiaries of non-
seamen killed in territorial waters when neither the Jones Act 
nor DOHSA apply has been left open.13S Furthermore, the 
132. Miles, 498 U.S. at 26-30. The Court announced: 
We no longer live in an era when seamen and their loved 
ones must look primarily to the courts as a source of sub-
stantive legal protection from . . . death; Congress . . . 
!has) legislated extensively in [this area) .... In this era, 
an admiralty court should look primarily to these legisla-
tive enactments for policy guidance. We may supplement 
these statutory remedies where doing so would achieve 
the uniform vindication of such policies consistent with 
our constitutional mandate, but we must also keep strictly 
within the limits imposed by Congress. 
1d. at 27. Herein, Justice O'Connor appeared to abrogate the policy of special 
solicitude toward seamen in favor of the rather disingenuous notion that modem 
seamen need not look to the courts for protection, because Congress has already 
provided them protection by means of the Jones Act (including its well established 
pecuniary limitation). See id. 
133. See Miles, 498 U.S. at 30-33; see also Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 622-26; 
Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 585-90; Moragne, 398 U.S. at 397-409. 
134. See Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 585-90; Moragne, 398 U.S. at 397-409. 
135. See Miles, 498 U.S. at 30-33; Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 622-26. 
136. See Walker v. Braus, 861 F. Supp. 527, 535 (E.n. La. 1994) (holding by 
direction of the Fifth Circuit that Miles' emphasis on uniformity in maritime law 
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question remains after Miles, if loss of society damages are a 
remedy in a Moragne action, whether the parents of non-sea-
men are allowed to recover such damages without showing 
that they were financial dependents of the decedent.137 
compelled the decision that the dependent beneficiaries of a non-seaman killed in 
territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime 
law), remand before decision, 995 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1993); Choat v. Kawasaki Mo-
tors Corp., 1994 A.M.C. 2626, 2640 (Ala. 1994) (holding that Miles' emphasis on 
uniformity in maritime law compelled the decision that the beneficiaries of a mari-
time fatality could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime 
law); Texaco Refining and Marketing, Inc. v. Estate of Dau Van Tran, 808 S.W.2d 
61, 63 (Tex. 1991) (holding that Miles' emphasis on uniformity in maritime law 
compelled the decision that the beneficiaries of a maritime fatality could not recov-
er loss of society damages under general maritime law). But see Earles II, 26 F.3d 
at 917 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that because neither the Jones Act nor DOHSA ap-
plied, the court was free to affirm substantial awards for loss of society made to 
the non-dependent parents of non-seamen killed in territorial waters); cf. Emery v. 
Rock Island Boatworks, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 114, 116-18 (E.D. Ill. 1994) (holding 
that the spouse of a non-seaman injured in state waters may recover loss of soci-
ety damages because neither the Jones Act nor DOHSA applied to preclude or 
limit damages). See generally Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 585-90 (granting lower courts 
sitting in admiralty the discretion to award loss of society damages on a case-by-
case basis because, although such awards are non-pecuniary, they are measurable, 
and courts have demonstrated their ability to control excessive awards); THOMAS J. 
SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAw § 8-3, at 476 (Practitioner's ed. 
1994) (noting that Miles, by deciding the treatment of seamen and longshoremen, 
solved one discrepancy in uniformity to create another, the treatment of non-sea-
men). 
137. Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., No. 93-7490, 1994 WL 685690, at 
*3-4 (2d Cir. Dec. 5, 1994) (holding that federal maritime law does not allow re-
covery for loss of society to non-dependent family members); Air Disaster at 
Lockerbie Scotland on December 21, 1988, 37 F.3d 804, 828-30 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(holding that federal maritime law does not allow recovery for loss of society to 
non-dependent family members); Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd., 4 
F.3d 1084, 1090-93 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the non-dependent parents of a 
non-seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages 
under general maritime law), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1060 (1994); Anderson v. 
Whittaker Corp., 894 F.2d 804, 811-12 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that the non-depen-
dent parents of non-seamen killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of 
society damages under general maritime law); Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 989 
(5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the non-dependent parent of a seaman killed in terri-
torial waters could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime 
law), affd sub nom. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990); Cantore v. 
Blue Lagoon Water Sports, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1151, 1152-55 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (hold-
ing that the parents of a non-seaman killed in territorial waters could recover loss 
of society damages under general maritime law only if they were financial depen-
dents of the decedent); Lipworth v. Kawasaki Motors Corp. U.S.A., 592 So. 2d 
1151, 1154-55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding the non-dependent parents of 
non-seamen killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages 
under general maritime law); Perlman v. Valdes, 575 So. 2d 216, 217 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the non-dependent parents of a non-seaman killed in 
25
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D. MILES' EFFECT ON THE ELEMENTS OF DAMAGES ALLOWED 
IN A GENERAL MARITIME WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION 
Since Miles, lower courts have steered all points of the 
compass in an effort to apply the Supreme Court's dicta on 
non-pecuniary damages in cases dealing with non-seamen.138 
Some courts interpret Miles broadly, applying the uniformity 
principle to preclude loss of society in all general maritime 
cases except those authorized by the Supreme Court. 139 The 
territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime 
law). But see Earles 11, 26 F.3d at 917 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that loss of society 
damages could be awarded to the parents of non·seamen killed in territorial wa-
ters regardless of dependency); cf. Randall v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 13 F.3d 888, 
903-04 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that the dependent beneficiaries of a longshoreman 
killed in territorial waters could recover loss of society damages regardless of de-
pendency); Walker, 861 F. Supp. at 538 (holding by direction of the Fifth Circuit 
that the dependent family members of a non-seaman killed in territorial waters 
could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime law regardless of 
dependency); Choat, 1994 A.M.C. at 2640 (holding that the non-dependent mother 
of a non-seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society dam-
ages regardless of dependency). See generally, SCHOENBAUM, supra note 136 § 8-3, 
at 476 n.36 (noting that because Miles was based on the preclusive effect of the 
Jones Act, loss of society could still be available to the beneficiaries of non-sea-
men, but that such awards were only allowed to parents who were financially 
dependent on the decedent). 
138. See Steven K. Carr, Living and Dying in the Post-Miles World: A Review 
of Compensatory and Punitive Damages Following Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 68 
TuL. L. REV. 595, 598 n.19 (1994) (noting that, post-Miles, lower courts which 
ignore the Supreme Court's broader call for uniform remedies in maritime law are 
in the minority and risk the scrutiny of appellate review). 
139. The Supreme Court in Miles declined to overrule Gaudet. Miles v. Apex 
Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 31-32 (1990). However, in limiting Gaudet to its facts 
the Court stated: "[tlhe holding of Gaudet applies only in territorial waters, and it 
applies only to longshoremen." Id. Some courts have connoted from reading this 
passage, together with the emphasis the Supreme Court placed on uniformity of 
recovery in Miles, that loss of society is implicitly prohibited in general maritime 
law to all but "longshoremen in territorial waters." See Walker v. Braus, 995 F.2d 
77, 82 (5th Cir. 1993) (remanding with directions to the district court that to 
allow the widow of a non-seaman killed in territorial waters to recover loss of 
society "would directly contradict the policy of uniformity emphasized and relied on 
by the [Supremel Court in Miles); see also Texaco Refining and Marketing, Inc. v. 
Estate of Dau Van Tran, 808 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1991) (declining to award loss of 
society damages to the beneficiaries of a non-seaman killed in territorial waters, 
because he was not a longshoreman); but see Smallwood v. American Trading & 
Transp. Co., 839 F. Supp. 1377, 1384-85 (holding that loss of society damages 
could not be awarded to the beneficiaries of a longshoreman killed in territorial 
waters under the general maritime law because of Miles' limitation on Gaudet 
coupled with the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA); cf. Randall v. Chevron, 
U.s.A., Inc., 13 F.3d 888, 903 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that even though loss of 
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Ninth Circuit and other courts limit Miles to seamen's cases, 
and hold that when not compelled by legislation, such as the 
Jones Act, the general maritime law requires awarding extend-
ed remedies to beneficiaries of non-seamen even if inconsistent 
with the limited recovery allowed to statutory suitors.14o One 
interesting development born out of the courts' struggle is the 
application of a judicially-fashioned financial dependency re-
quirement as a prerequisite for awarding parents of maritime 
fatalities loss of society damages.141 
Only eight days before the Earles II opmIon was pub-
lished, the Alabama Supreme Court, applying general mari-
time law, declined to award recovery for loss of society to a 
non-dependent parent of a non-seaman killed in state territori-
al waters. 142 Since Earles II, the District Court for the East-
ern District of Louisiana, deciding a case on remand from the 
Fifth Circuit, declined to follow Earles II, criticizing the Ninth 
Circuit's treatment of the damages issue.143 The Ninth Cir-
society damages were "severely limited" in Miles, under general maritime law, the 
beneficiaries of a longshoreman killed in territorial waters could recover loss of 
society damages pursuant to Miles' limitation on Ga.udet); Miles, 498 U.S. at 31 
n.l (noting that, "[als with Moragne, the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA have 
rendered Gaudet inapplicable on its facts."). 
140. Sutton v. Earles ("Earles II"), 26 F.3d 903, 914-17 (9th Cir. 1994); cf. Em-
ery v. Rock Island Boatworks, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 114, 116-18 (E.D. Ill. 1994) (hold-
ing that the spouse of a non-seaman injured in state waters could recover loss of 
society damages because neither the Jones Act nor DOHSA applied to preclude or 
limit damages); Schumacher v. Cooper, 850 F. Supp. 438, 453-54 (D. S.C. 1994) 
(holding that the dependents of a non-seaman injured in state waters could recov-
er loss of society damages because neither the Jones Act nor DOHSA applied to 
preclude or limit damages). But see Chan v. Society Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 
1398, 1407-08 (9th Cir. 1994) (declining to award loss of society damages to the 
dependent family members of a non-seaman injured on the high seas, because 
DOHSA denies such recovery to the beneficiaries of those killed on the high seas, 
plus, the Supreme Court emphasized uniformity of damages among maritime tort 
actions in Miles). 
141. See Cantore v. Blue Lagoon Water Sports, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1151, 1152-55 
(S.D. Fla. 1992) (holding that maritime wrongful death plaintiffs may recover loss 
of society damages for the death of non-seamen in territorial waters only if they 
are financial dependents of the decedent). 
142. Choat v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 1994 A.M.C. 2626 (Ala. 1994) (not other-
wise reported). 
143. See Walker v. Braus, 861 F. Supp. 527, 535 <E.D. La. 1994) (holding by 
direction of the Fifth Circuit that Miles' emphasis on uniformity in maritime law 
compelled the decision that the dependent beneficiaries of a non-seaman killed in 
territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime 
law), remand before decision, 995 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1993); but see Earles II, 26 
27
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cuit itself issued two seemingly inconsistent decisions soon 
after publishing Earles 11.144 The Second Circuit has also is-
sued two recent opinions on point, both holding that under 
general maritime law, only dependent relatives may recover 
damages for loss of society.145 Nevertheless, one district court 
within the Seventh Circuit recently used the same approach to 
the damages issue as the Ninth Circuit used in Earles II.146 
Although a split among the Federal Circuits has developed, the 
Supreme Court has yet to adopt a rule that explicitly settles 
the issue of who may recover loss of society damages when, as 
in Earles II, non-seamen perish within territorial waters. 147 
Thus, whether the Ninth Circuit correctly interpreted the law 
of maritime wrongful death when, in Earles II, it plotted a 
course for the future of loss of society damages in general mar-
itime law, has yet to be determined.148 
F.3d at 914-17. 
144. See Davis v. Bender Shipbuilding, 27 F.3d 426, 430 (9th Cir. 1994) (declin-
ing to award loss of society damages to the family members of a seaman in a 
general maritime wrongful death action against a shipyard that was not a Jones 
Act defendant, even though neither DORSA nor the Jones Act applied to preclude 
or limit damages, because the underlying rationale for maritime wrongful death 
actions is based on the need for uniformity as emphasized in Miles); Chan, 39 
F.3d at 1407-08 (declining to award loss of society damages to the dependent fami-
ly members of a non-seaman injured on the high seas, even though neither the 
Jones Act nor DORSA applied, because DORSA denies such recovery to the bene-
ficiaries of those killed on the high seas, plus, the Supreme Court emphasized 
uniformity of damages among maritime tort actions in Miles). 
145. Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., No. 93-7490, 1994 WL 685690, at 
*3-4 (2d Cir. Dec. 5, 1994); Air Disaster at Lockerbie Scotland on December 21, 
1988, 37 F.3d 804, 828-30 (2d Cir. 1994). 
146. See Emery, 847 F. Supp. at 118 (holding that the spouse of a non-seaman 
injured in state territorial waters could recover loss of society damages because 
neither the Jones Act nor DORSA applied to preclude or limit damages). There is 
no distinction between fatal and non-fatal injuries when awarding loss of society 
damages under general maritime law. Cater v. Placid Oil, 760 F. Supp. 568, 571 
(E.D. La. 1991). 
147. See supra notes 10, 136-37 and accompanying text. 
148. See Earles II, 26 F.3d at 917; but see Wahlstrom, 4 F.3d at 1090-93 (hold-
ing that the non-dependent parents of a non-seaman killed in territorial waters 
could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime law); Miles v. 
Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 989 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the non-dependent parent 
of a seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages 
under general maritime law), affd sub nom. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 
19 (1990); Anderson, 894 F.2d 804, 811-12 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that the non-
dependent parents of non-seamen killed in territorial waters could not recover loss 
of society damages under general maritime law); Walker, 861 F. Supp. at 536 
(criticizing Earles II as inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Miles, 
because the court in Earles II created a non-uniform scheme of recovery under 
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E. Loss OF SOCIETY ISSUE IN THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT 
COURTS 
1. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits: Trend to Eliminate Loss 
Of Society Damages from General Maritime Law 
a. Fifth Circuit 
The rule of general maritime wrongful death reqUlnng 
that loss of society only be awarded to financially dependent 
beneficiaries has its genesis in the Fifth Circuit's 1985 decision 
in Sistrunk v. Circle Bar Drilling CO.149 Sistrunk held that 
the non-dependent parents of deceased seamen killed in terri-
torial waters could not recover loss of society under general 
maritime law when the seamen were survived by spouses or 
children.15o In doing so, the court denied relief to the non-' 
dependent parents of two brothers who died when the drilling 
vessel they worked on capsized in Louisiana state waters.151 
The court commenced its analysis noting that it was guided by 
general maritime case law.152 DOHSA did not apply because 
the deaths took place in territorial waters.153 Although the 
Jones Act applied, because the parents' claims were precluded 
by the spouses' and childrens' claims under the Jones Act's 
schedule of beneficiaries, the issue was whether the parents 
could recover loss of society damages relying on Gaudet in a 
general maritime law wrongful death action under 
Moragne. 154 Employing the analytical framework of Moragne, 
the court reasoned it was guided by the "twin aims" of admi-
ralty: "achieving uniformity in the exercise of admiralty juris-
diction and providing special solicitude to seamen.,,155 
In Sistrunk, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that denying loss of 
society would provide more uniformity to maritime law because 
maritime law within the Ninth Circuit and among federal circuits). 
149. 770 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1985), reh'g denied, 775 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1019 (1986). 




154. [d. at 458. 
155. Sistrunk, 770 F.2d at 458. 
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parents similarly situated as the plaintiffs were denied stand-
ing under the Jones Act, and could not recover such damages 
under DOHSA or the general maritime law if the deaths had 
occurred on the high seas.156 Regarding special solicitude, the 
court reasoned that because the rationale behind the principle 
is to benefit seamen's dependents, and that since the parents 
were not dependent on the decedent-seamen, the principle did 
not apply under the facts of the case.157 The court announced: 
To the extent that the purpose of admiralty's 
special solicitude to the survivors of seamen is to 
provide for their financial support, the special 
solicitude aim of admiralty has no relevance in 
this case. The parents in this case were not 
dependent on their sons. If a purpose of the 
solicitude is to provide the survivors peace of 
mind both before a seaman undertakes to ven-
ture upon hazardous and unpredictable sea 
voyages and after the death of the seaman, 
admiralty's special solicitude does not automati-
cally mean that the parents in this case should 
recover. As stated above, the parents could not 
recover if the seamen's deaths occurred on the 
high seas .... Admiralty cannot provide the 
parents solicitude at a voyage's outset when 
their right to recover for loss of society is depen-
dent on the fortuity that the deaths occur in 
territorial waters .... 158 
This explanation for special solicitude given by the Sistrunk 
court became the benchmark for later decisions which devel-
oped the dependency rule.159 
One year later, the Fifth Circuit published Patton-Tully 
Transp. Co. v. Ratliff,16o wherein the court held that depen-
156. Id. at 459. Existence of spouses and children, preferred beneficiaries under 
the Jones Act, precluded the parents' recovery. Id. Moreover, if the deaths had oc-
curred on the high seas, DOHSA and Higginbotham would have limited the par-
ent-beneficiaries recovery to pecuniary loss. Id. 
157. Id. at 460. 
158. Sistrunk, 770 F.2d at 460; see KiPLING, supra note 1, at 216. 
159. See Cantore v. Blue Lagoon Water Sports, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1151, 1152-55 
(S.D. Fla. 1992) (tracing the development of a financial dependency requirement 
for the recovery of loss of society in general maritime law wrongful death actions). 
160. 797 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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dent relatives of a Jones Act seaman could recover loss of soci-
ety damages under general maritime law. 161 In Patton-Tully, 
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's loss of society 
award under general maritime law.162 The district court had 
awarded loss of society to the dependent siblings of a seven-
teen year old skiff operator who drowned when his boat cap-
sized while ferrying workers across the Mississippi River.163 
The defendant had argued that the decedent qualified as a 
Jones Act seaman, and thus the siblings were barred from 
recovery under general maritime law by analogy to the Jones 
Act's schedule of beneficiaries that allowed only one class of 
beneficiary, the seamen's mother, to recover damages. l64 The 
court reasoned, however, that because the policy behind award-
ing loss of society was "to insure compensation of the depen-
dents for their losses resulting from the decedent's death," each 
dependent of a family's sole source of income was entitled to 
recover damages for loss of society under general maritime 
law. 165 Finally, the court in Patton-Tully distinguished 
Sistrunk because the parents in Sistrunk were non-depen-
dents, whereas in Patton-Tully, all claimants were family 
members and were financial dependents of the decedent, re-
gardless of their familial relationship to him.l66 Patton-Tully 
demonstrates that in an action where loss of society is permit-
ted, certain conditions must be met with regard to loss before 
the court may allow recovery. 167 
The next case in this line, Truehart v. Blandon , 168 was 
decided by the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisi-
ana in the wake of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Sistrunk. The 
court in Truehart extended the Sistrunk financial dependency 
rule to non-seamen.169 The court declined to award loss of so-
ciety to the non-dependent parents and siblings of an adult 
16l. Patton-Tully Transp. Co. v. Ratliff, 797 F.2d 206, 213 (5th Cir. 1986). 
162. [d. 
163. [d. at 208, 213. 
164. [d. at 212. 
165. [d. at 213 (quoting Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 583) (emphasis in original). 
166. Patton-Tully, 797 F.2d at 213. 
167. See id.; STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND 
INJURY § 3:51, at 238-41 (3rd ed. 1992). 
168. 672 F. Supp. 929 (E.D. La 1987). See Matthew E. Roy, Whittling Down 
Loss of Society in Maritime Wrongful Death Actions, 14 TuL. MAR. L.J. 393 (1990). 
169. Truehart v. Blandon, 672 F. Supp. 929, 937 (E.D. La 1987). 
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pleasure boater who perished when the yacht he was aboard 
allided with the causeway bridge on Lake Pontchartrain in 
Louisiana. 170 Significantly, the district court's reliance on 
Sistrunk's policy to award uniform recovery between statutory 
maritime cases and Moragne actions contributed to the devel-
opment of the financial dependency requirement. 171 
The Truehart court addressed the anomaly in maritime 
wrongful death recovery wherein Gaudet allowed loss of society 
in Moragne actions, while DORSA and the Jones Act did 
not. 172 The court harmonized the three remedial causes of ac-
tion by using Higginbotham's admonition that non-pecuniary 
damages should not be a disproportionately high percentage of 
recovery in a Moragne action for death of a non-seaman in 
territorial waters.173 The court concluded that whenever a 
beneficiary is not financially dependent upon the decedent, loss 
. of society should not be allowed.174 The court reasoned that 
whenever a beneficiary is not financially dependent upon the 
decedent loss of society damages will necessarily be dispropor-
tionate to the amount of pecuniary loss, and therefore, pose a 
significant threat to uniformity between recovery under the 
remedial statutes and the general maritime law.175 Thus, be-
cause the claimants in Truehart were non-dependent, and 
hence loss of society was a "substantial portion" of their prayer 
for relief, the court decided to draw a policy line at dependency 
without regard to seaman status. 176 The court bolstered its 
argument that dependency is the critical factor by citing 
Patton-Tully's emphasis on the claimant's dependency, rather 
than the claimant's mere familial relation to the decedent, as 
allowing recovery.177 The court then concluded: 
[T]his Court notes that somewhere a line must 
be drawn between those who may recover for 
loss of society and those who may not. The line 
suggested in Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit 
170. [d. at 930. 
171. [d. at 936-38. 
172. [d. at 936. 
173. [d. 
174. Truehart, 672 F. Supp. at 936. 
175. [d. 
176. [d. at 936-37. 
177. [d. at 937-38. 
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opmIOns, the line between dependents and 
nondependents, appears to be the most rational, 
efficient and fair. A requirement of dependency 
creates a finite, determinable class of beneficia-
ries.178 
65 
The significance of the Truehart court's reliance on the 
policy behind Sistrunk to develop the dependency rule may 
escape first glance.179 However, because the Jones Act allows 
recovery for seamen only, when the court in Sistrunk advocat-
ed uniformity between general maritime remedies and Jones 
Act recovery, it implicitly favored uniformity in damages be-
tween non-seamen and seamen.180 Moreover, the same logic 
applies to DOH SA, because uniformity between DOHSA and 
Moragne action recovery necessarily results in consistent dam-
ages for wrongful death whether on the high seas or in territo-
rial waters.181 Thus, the scope of the dependency rule was de-
fined when the Truehart court declined to distinguish Sistrunk 
on the basis that it involved Jones Act seamen, reasoning that 
it would be contrary to basic admiralty principles to extend 
greater solicitude to the families of non-seamen than to fami-
lies of seamen, the "wards of admiralty."182 In failing to dis-
tinguish Sistrunk as a case involving Jones Act seamen, the 
Truehart court gave teeth to the proposition that only depen-
dents may recover loss of society damages under general mari-
time law whether or not the death occurred in territorial wa-
ters or on the high seas and whether or not the decedent was a 
seaman or a non-seaman. 183 
In 1989, the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana decided Neal v. Barisich, Inc. l84 In Neal, the court 
held that parents of a seaman who drowned when he was 
thrown overboard after two vessels collided on the Mississippi 
River were not entitled to loss of society damages under gener-
178. Id. at 938. 
179. See Truehart, 672 F. Supp. at 936·38. 
180. See Sistrunk, 770 F.2d at 459. 
181. See Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 624. "DOHSA should be the courts' primary 
guide as they refine the nonstatutory death remedy, . . . because of the interest in 
uniformity .... " Id. 
182. See Truehart, 672 F. Supp. at 937. 
183. See Cantore, 799 F. Supp. at 1152·55. 
184. 707 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. La. 1989), affd, 889 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1989). 
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al maritime law.185 The court predicated its finding on depen-
dency.186 The court reasoned that neither parent was allowed 
to recover loss of society because the decedent's mother had not 
lived with the decedent for many years and was not financially 
dependent on him, and, although the decedent lived with his 
father, the father was not a financial dependent of his son.187 
Since Neal was pre-Miles, the court began by noting that, 
although loss of society damages were generally not allowed 
under the Jones Act, non-pecuniary damages could be awarded 
to the beneficiaries of seamen pursuing unseaworthiness 
claims under general maritime law.188 Next, the Neal court 
noted that Truehart addressed substantially the same issue, 
namely whether non-dependent parents have a right to recover 
loss of society damages under general maritime law for the 
wrongful death of their child.1Sg The court further noted that, 
although Truehart answered the question in the negative, the 
Truehart court's notion of "dependency" was based on a pecuni-
ary definition of the word "dependent ... 190 Thus, the Neal 
court noted that Truehart left open the possibility a court 
might give the term "dependency" a broader interpretation and 
might base dependency on factors tending to prove a mutually 
supportive relationship between the decedent and the benefi-
ciary, such as whether they had continuously resided together 
over a substantial period of time, rather than on financial 
support alone.l9l Nonetheless, the court declined to go beyond 
the plain meaning of the term "dependency" as defined in 
Truehart, and did not give it any meaning other than financial 
dependency. 192 
The Neal court noted that, at that time, only six cases 
existed under the general maritime law within the Fifth Cir-
cuit wherein parents had sought loss of society for the mari-
185. Neal v. Barisich, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 862, 870-73 (E.D. La. 1989). 
186. 1d. at 872-73. 
187. 1d. 
188. 1d. at 870. 
189. 1d. 
190. Neal, 707 F. Supp. at 870. 
191. See id. 
192. 1d. at 872; see Truehart, 672 F.2d at 937. 
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time wrongful death of their child.193 The court noted that 
Patton-Tully was the only one of these cases in which an 
award was granted, but distinguished Patton-Tully from the 
others on the fact that the parent in Patton-Tully was a finan-
cial dependent of her son.194 Addressing the case at bar, the 
court reasoned that the decedent's mother had not lived with 
her son for many years, and was not financially dependent on 
him, and thus held that her claim must be dismissed.195 
Next, the court considered whether the fact the decedent lived 
with his father was enough to distinguish his claim from that 
of the petitioners in Truehart. l96 Lacking a policy rationale 
for making the common residency distinction determinative, 
the court concluded, "admiralty law suggests no good reason 
for treating nondependent surviving parents who had been 
living with their deceased child any differently from those who 
had not. Thus, the Court must dismiss the father's loss-of-
society claim."197 Neal emphasizes the proposition in Sistrunk 
and Truehart that financial dependency is the critical fac-
tor. 19B Moreover, like Patton-Tully, Neal demonstrates that in 
deciding whether to award loss of society damages, a court 
must analyze the facts presented by the case before extending 
relief. 199 Finally, Neal represents the Fifth Circuit's reluc-
tance to stray from uniformity at the expense of solicitude.2°O 
In 1990, the Supreme Court handed down Miles v. Apex 
Marine Corp., affirming the Fifth Circuit's holding in Miles v. 
Melrose,201 that in a general maritime wrongful death action 
the non-dependent parent of a seaman could not recover for 
193. Neal, 707 F. Supp. at 870-73. 
194. [d. 
195. [d. at 872. 
196. [d. 
197. [d. at 872-73; but see infra notes 534-43 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion on factors admiralty courts might consider in determining whether a bene-
ficiary could recover for loss of society. 
198. See Neal, 707 F. Supp. at 870-73; see also Sistrunk, 770 F.2d at 458-60; 
Truehart, 672 F. Supp. at 936-38. 
199. See Neal, 707 F. Supp. at 870-73; see also Patton·Tully, 797 F.2d at 213; 
SPEISER, supra note 167, § 3:51, at 238-41. 
200. See Neal, 707 F. Supp. at 870-73; see also Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 
989 (5th Cir. 1989), affd sub nom. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 
(1990) .. 
201. 882 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1989), affd sub nom. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 
498 U.S. 19 (1990). 
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loss of society. The Fifth Circuit had explained its decision by 
implying that it was based more on policy than precedent: 
Since loss of society is not a financial loss, re-
stricting its recovery to dependents may seem 
unwarranted. However, tort law has never rec-
ognized a principle of awarding redress to all 
. who are injured by an event, however wide the 
ripple .... The number of plaintiffs who could 
allege noss of society] ... necessitates that we 
draw a line between those who may recover ... 
and those who may not. The line suggested by 
the Supreme Court in Moragne and Gaudet, and 
by our own court in Sistrunk, the line between 
dependents and nondependents, "appears to be 
the most rational efficient and fair.202 
After the Supreme Court affirmed Miles, there has been a 
trend in the Fifth Circuit to eliminate loss of society from the 
general maritime law altogether. 203 However, the Fifth 
Circuit's 1994 decision in Randall v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. 204 
recognized that, even though Gaudet was severely limited to 
its facts in Miles, loss of society is proper when a longshoreman 
perishes in territorial waters.205 The court affirmed substan-
tial awards for loss of society to the wife and adult children of 
a maritime worker who drowned when he fell into Louisiana 
waters while being evacuated from an oil drilling platform 
during a hurricane.206 Although the court found the adult 
children were financial dependents of the decedent, in dicta the 
court addressed the defendant's reliance on the dependency 
rule stating, "[iJn our view, the law of this circuit does not 
unequivocally limit recovery of loss of society damages for the 
wrongful death of a parent to children who are financially 
dependent on the deceased. "207 
However, the significance of the Fifth Circuit's decision in 
202. Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 988-89 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Truehart, 
672 F. Supp. at 938). 
203. See Walker v. Braus, 861 F. Supp. 527, 531-38 (E.D. La. 1994), remand 
before decision, 995 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1993). 
204. 13 F.3d 888 (5th Cir. 1994). 
205. Randall v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 13 F.3d 888, 903 (5th Cir. 1994). 
206. 1d. at 902-04. 
207. 1d. at 903. 
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Randall appears to be limited to its application under the 
Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of Gaudet.208 In fact, 
the Fifth Circuit has since gone beyond the dependency rule 
for recovery of loss of society in general maritime law toward 
eliminating loss of society altogether from the panoply of reme-
dies allowed for maritime wrongful death.209 This trend is a 
result of the Fifth Circuit's broad reading of the uniformity 
requirement emphasized in Miles, as well as a literal reading 
of Miles' treatment of Gaudet.210 Between the Supreme 
Court's decision in Miles and the Ninth Circuit's decision in 
Earles II, the Fifth Circuit declined to award loss of society to 
beneficiaries in three of the four cases in which it considered 
the issue.211 The only case in which loss of society damages 
were awarded was in Randall where the court found Gaudet 
was still good law.212 The Fifth Circuit applied the Gaudet 
damages rule to the facts of Randall to award the dependent 
relatives of a longshoreman killed in territorial waters damag-
es for loss of society. 213 
b. Eleventh Circuit 
In 1992, a district court within the Eleventh Circuit decid-
ed Cantore v. Blue Lagoon Water Sports, Inc. 214 Cantore in-
volved the wrongful death of a jet ski operator who died in a 
collision with another jet ski on navigable waters in the Flori-
da Keys.215 The court held that the parents of a non-seaman 
208. See Miles, 498 U.S. at 31. 
209. Walker, 861 F. Supp. at 533-38. 
210. See id. at 533. 
211. [d. In the three cases wherein the Fifth Circuit declined to award loss of 
society damages, the court did so regardless of dependency. Nichols v. Petroleum 
Helicopters, Inc., 17 F.3d 119, 122-23 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that the dependent 
beneficiaries of a longshoreman killed on the high seas could not recover loss of 
society damages); Michel v. Total Transp., Inc., 957 F.2d 186, 191 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that the dependents of a seaman could not recover loss of society damag-
es); Murry v. Anthony J. Bertucci Constr. Co., 958 F.2d 127, 129-32 (5th Cir. 
1992) (holding that the wife of a seaman injured in territorial waters could not 
recover loss of society damages), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 190 (1992). 
212. See Randall, 13 F.3d at 903. 
213. [d. 
214. 799 F. Supp. 1151 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (holding that maritime wrongful death 
plaintiffs may recover loss of society damages for the death of non-seamen in 
territorial waters only if they are financial dependents of the decedent). 
215. Cantore v. Blue Lagoon Water Sports, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1151, 1152 (S.D. 
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killed in territorial waters were entitled to loss of society in a 
wrongful death action under general maritime law only if fi-
nancial dependency is proven.216 The Cantore court's decision 
is significant because it provides a comprehensive and clear 
post-Miles review of the elements of damages available for 
wrongful death under general maritime law to beneficiaries of 
non-seamen killed in territorial waters.217 Moreover, the deci-
sion traced the dependency requirement for awarding loss of 
society and reached the conclusion that the trend is now set-
tled law. 218 
The Cantore court first noted the split of authority con-
cerning whether beneficiaries may recover loss of society.219 
The court then identified that, post-Miles, the trend was to 
deny loss of society damages to non-dependents.22o Address-
ing Miles' application to a non-seaman's case, the court stated 
that Miles was persuasive, but not controlling.221 Further-
more, the court noted that in a non-seaman's case, recovery 
may be allowed, because neither the Jones Act nor DOHSA 
applied.222 However, turning to precedent, the court cited 
Truehart for the proposition that distinguishing seamen cases 
from non-seamen cases for the purpose of extending greater 
recovery to non-seamen was contrary to the tenet of awarding 
seamen, the "wards of admiralty," maritime law's most gener-
ous protection.223 The court continued by citing Miles for the 
proposition that the Supreme Court, in an effort to restore 
uniformity to maritime law, intended to limit non-dependent 
beneficiaries from recovering loss of society damages.224 
The thrust of the court's analysis in Cantore involved iden-
tifying dependency as the sine qua non225 of recovery for loss 
Fla. 1992). 
216. [d. at 1155. 
217. See id. at 1152-56; see also THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MAR-
ITIME LAw § 8-3, at 476 n.36 (Practitioner's ed. 1994). 
218. Cantore, 799 F. Supp. at 1152-54. 
219. [d. at 1152. 
220. [d. 
221. [d. at 1153. 
222. [d. 
223. Cantore, 799 F. Supp. at 1153. 
224. [d. 
225. Sine qua non is Latin for "without which not," i.e., the essence of some-
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of society in earlier decisions.226 The court identified depen-
dency as the critical factor in the Fifth Circuit cases, Truehart 
and Sistrunk, as well as in the Sixth Circuit's decision in An-
derson v. Whittaker Corp.,227 and numerous state cases apply-
ing federal maritime law.228 The court concluded, "[a]s the 
foregoing case law demonstrates, general maritime law has 
moved toward a denial of recovery for loss of society where the 
survivors are not dependent on the decedent."229 In following 
Truehart's analysis, Cantore became the definitive post-Miles 
case advocating dependency on the decedent as the bright line 
rule for recovery of loss of society damages under general mari-
time law. 230 
Although Cantore has been cited by at least one learned 
treatise231 as exemplary of the damages allowed to a non-
seaman's beneficiary in a Moragne action, in 1993, another 
. district court within the Eleventh Circuit indicated in dicta 
that Cantore was bad law.232 In Complaint of Nobles233 
("Nobles"), the District Court for the Northern District of Flori-
da addressed maritime claims for loss of support,234 as well 
as for loss of society.235 The claims were brought by the par-
ents of a boy who was killed when the ski boat he was aboard 
struck a boat house in Florida State territorial waters.236 Ad-
dressing the claim for loss of support, the court followed prece-
dent in holding that the parents could not recover absent a 
thing. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1385 (6th ed. 1990). 
226. Cantore, 799 F. Supp. at 1152·56. 
227. 894 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1990); see infra notes 348·57 and accompanying text 
for a discussion on Anderson. 
228. Cantore, 799 F. Supp. at 1153·54. 
229. [d. at 1155. 
230. THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAw § 8·3, at 476 n.36 
(Practitioner's ed. 1994). 
231. [d. 
232. Complaint of Nobles ("Noblesb ), 842 F. Supp. 1430, 1434 n.8 (N.D. Fla. 
1993). 
233. 842 F. Supp. 1430 (N.D. Fla. 1993). 
234. Nobles, 842 F. Supp. at 1434. Loss of support under general maritime law 
includes all the financial contributions that the decedent would have made to his 
dependents had he lived, 'and therefore it is a pecuniary element of damages. Sea· 
Land Services v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 584·85 (1974). See supra note 41 for a 
definition of pecuniary damages. 
235. Nobles, 842 F. Supp. at 1434. 
236. [d. at 1432. 
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showing of financial dependency on the child.237 Nevertheless, 
the court did not strike the parents' claim for loss of soci-
ety.238 Criticizing Cantore, the court noted, "[t]his [c]ourt 
finds that [the] reasoning that ties recovery for loss of society 
to financial dependency strained, and, therefore, will not ad-
here to the conclusion reached in Cantore."239 As a result, the 
court appeared to make a policy decision not to apply a pecuni-
ary standard in awarding non-pecuniary damages.24o 
On May 27, 1994, just eight days before the Ninth Circuit 
handed down Earles II, the Supreme Court of Alabama decided 
Choat v. Kawasaki Motors Corp.241 Applying federal maritime 
law under the "savings to suitors clause,,,242 the court fol-
lowed precedent and held that in a general maritime wrongful 
death action Miles precluded recovery of non-pecuniary damag-
es, such as loss of society.243 The court denied loss of society 
to the non-dependent mother of an eighteen year old woman 
who died without spouse or issue when she was accidentally 
struck by a jet ski on the Tennessee River in Alabama.244 Af-
ter tracing the history of maritime wrongful death, the court 
interpreted Miles' emphasis on uniformity as the Supreme 
Court's implicit adoption of the dissent's opinion in Gaudet, 
which favored uniformity over extending remedies. 245 The 
Alabama court thus asserted that Miles controlled the holding 
237. 1d. at 1434. 
238. 1d. 
239. 1d. at 1434 n.8. 
240. See Nobles, 842 F. Supp. at 1434 n.8. 
241. 1994 A.M.C. 2626 (Ala. 1994) (not otherwise reported). 
242. The "savings to suitors" clause of the United States Constitution, Article 3, 
section 2, clause I, which extends federal judicial power over cases of admiralty 
and maritime jurisdiction, provides for a plaintiff asserting an in personam admi-
ralty claim to sue in a common law (state court) in an ordinary civil action, but 
in such cases, the state court must apply the substantive rules of the maritime 
law as they would have been applied if the claim had been instituted in admiralty 
in federal court. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 <extending the judicial power of 
the United States to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction). See 28 
U.S.C. § 1333 (1988) (codifying the federal courts' authority to develop a substan-
tive body of general maritime law); Southern Pacific v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 254 
(1917) (holding that state law that changes, modifies, or affects the interstate 
uniformity of the general maritime law is unconstitutional). 
243. Choat v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 1994 A.M.C. 2626, 2639-40 (Ala. 1994) 
(not otherwise reported). 
244. 1d. 
245. 1d. at 2639. 
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in Choat.246 
Addressing the parent's claim that Miles only applied to 
seamen, the court noted that Miles expressly limited the hold-
ing of Gaudet to "longshoremen," and, therefore, Gaudet's loss 
of society remedy did not apply to non-seamen that are not 
longshoremen.247 Therefore, the court concluded, the remedy 
did not apply in Choat.248 Moreover, in dicta the court cited 
numerous post-Miles cases which denied loss of society under 
general maritime law, regardless of dependency.249 In follow-
ing precedent, and hence giving Miles the broadest application 
possible, the Supreme Court of Alabama expressly abandoned 
the dependency requirement for awarding non-pecuniary dam-
ages under general maritime law.250 The court stated: 
[Some] courts have implicitly or expressly reject-
ed dependency as the sine qua non of recover-
ability. Therefore, we do not base our conclusion 
on the ground that Choat was not financially 
dependent on her daughter. Instead, ... we 
interpret Miles as precluding recovery of non-
pecuniary damages, such as... loss of soci-
ety .... 251 
The court gave no further support for its position that the 
dependency rule was unsound.252 
As non-pecuniary damage awards ebb within the Fifth and 
Eleventh Circuits, the dependency rule has since spilled over 
into other federal circuits.253 If the Supreme Court overrules 
246. [d. 
247. [d. 
248. Choat, 1994 A.M.C. at 2639-40. 
249. [d. 
250. 1d. at 2640. 
251. [d. 
252. See id. 
253. See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., No. 93-7490, 1994 WL 
685690, at *3-4 (2d Cir. Dec. 5, 1994) (holding that federal maritime law does not 
allow recovery for loss of society to non-dependent family members); see also Air 
Disaster at Lockerbie Scotland on December 21, 1988, 37 F.3d 804, 828-30 (2d Cir. 
1994) (holding that federal maritime law does not allow recovery for los8 of society 
to non-dependent family members); Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd., 
4 F.3d 1084, 1090-93 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that non-dependent parents of a non-
seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages under 
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Gaudet, the dependency issue will become moot.254 However, 
if loss of society remains an element of recoverable damages in 
maritime wrongful death, dependency will continue to be an 
issue of contention until the Supreme Court rules on the mat-
ter.255 The Ninth Circuit considered these issues in Earles II, 
and affirmed substantial awards for loss of society, regardless 
of dependency. 
2. The Ninth Circuit: Dependents of Seamen Denied Loss of 
Society 
In 1982, the District Court for the Northern District of 
California decided Glod v. American President Lines, Ltd.256 
In Glod, the court denied recovery to the non-dependent sib-
lings of a Jones Act seaman who died when he fell from a 
ladder while boarding his ship.257 At the time of the accident, 
the vessel was docked in state territorial waters at Seattle, 
Washington.258 Although the siblings were the seaman's sole 
surviving heirs, the court determined that the siblings were 
not beneficiaries under the Jones Act, because they were not 
dependent relatives.259 The court then considered the siblings' 
claim under the general maritime law.260 The district court 
reasoned that deference to the weight of Supreme Court au-
thority in Higginbotham, which guides lower courts to use 
DOHSA's schedule of beneficiaries when deciding who should 
general maritime law), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1060 (1994); Anderson v. Whittaker 
Corp., 894 F.2d 804, 811-12 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that non-dependent parents of 
non-seamen killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages 
under general maritime law). 
254. See Walker, 861 F. Supp. at 535 (noting that by following the Fifth 
Circuit's trend to eliminate loss of society damages from maritime law altogether, 
and thus denying loss of society to the dependents non-seaman killed in territorial 
waters, the dependency requirement for recovering loss of society damages under 
general maritime law may no longer be viable). 
255. See id.; but see Randall, 13 F.3d at 903 (awarding loss of society damages 
to the adult dependent children of a longshoreman killed in territorial waters); 
Earles 11, 26 F.3d at 914-17 (awarding loss of society damages to the non-depen-
dent parents of adult non-seamen killed in territorial waters). 
256. 547 F. Supp. 183 (N.D. Cal. 1982). 
257. Glod v. American President Lines, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 183, 184 (N.D. Cal. 
1982). 
258. [d. 
259. [d. at 184-85. 
260. [d. at 185-86. 
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recover under general maritime law, supported the conclusion 
that non-dependents could not recover loss of society.261 
Moreover, the court noted that the expansive recovery for loss 
of society in Gaudet was predicated upon the majority of state 
statutes which allowed recovery for loss of society in wrongful 
death actions outside of the maritime arena.262 The court rea-
soned that the underlying rationale in Gaudet was not applica-
ble, because most states do not allow non-dependents to recov-
er in a wrongful death action.263 This, when coupled with 
Higginbotham's admonition that DOHSA be the federal courts' 
primary guide in a Moragne action, led the court to conclude 
dependency was a determinative factor when awarding reme-
dies for wrongful death under general maritime law.264 
In 1983, the Ninth Circuit decided Nygaard v. Peter Pan 
Seafoods, Inc. 265 The court in Nygaard, deciding an issue sim-
ilar to that later settled by the Supreme Court in Miles, held 
that non-pecuniary losses, such as loss of society, could not be 
recovered under the Jones Act.266 The court denied recovery 
for loss of society to the minor son of a seaman lost from a 
fishing vessel in the Bering Sea.267 The court noted that 
Higginbotham denied loss of society under DOHSA, and also, 
that the Supreme Court had not yet decided whether loss of 
society was allowed under the Jones Act.26B 
In Nygaard, the Ninth Circuit considered whether, in light 
of Moragne and· Gaudet, it would be more consistent with the 
humanitarian policy manifest in the extension of remedies 
under general maritime law to allow loss of society damag-
es.269 The Ninth Circuit looked to existing general maritime 
precedent and followed the First and Fifth Circuits in holding 
that loss of society was not recoverable.270 In reaching its con-
261. [d. 
262. Glad, 547 F. Supp. at 186. 
263. [d. 
264. [d. 
265. 701 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1983). 
266. Nygaard v. Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc., 701 F.2d 77, 79-80 (9th Cir. 1983). 
267. [d. at 78, 80. 
268. [d. at 79. 
269. [d. 
270. [d. at 80. 
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clusion, the court also cited the Second Circuit's decision in 
Igneri u. Compagnie de Transports Oceaniques271 for the prop-
osition that the Jones Act did not allow recovery ofnon-pecuni-
ary loss, such as loss of society.272 Moreover, the court noted 
that it agreed with the other circuits' reasoning that any injus-
tice perpetuated by the rule against recovery for non-pecuniary 
loss should be remedied by Congress.273 The court observed 
that "[d]eference to the First and Fifth Circuits, leads us [to 
our conclusion that] ... Moragne and Gaudet are authorities 
simply too oblique to justify a departure from settled law."274 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit demonstrated that, at least with re-
gard to seamen's recovery, its analysis was guided by uniformi-
ty among Federal Circuits and conformity with Congressional 
intent, not humanitarian policies favorable to extending reme-
dies.275 
In the same year as Nygaard, the District Court for the 
Western District of Washington decided Weyer u. ABC Charter-
ers, Inc. 276 Without the need to distinguish between the 
decedent's status as a seaman or non-seaman, the court held 
that a dependent divorced wife did not have standing to recov-
er in a Moragne action.277 Weyer involved an action brought 
by the divorced wife of a deceased pleasure boater278 who had 
been supporting his ex-wife pursuant to a dissolution con-
tract.279 The court followed Glod, a seaman's case, reasoning 
that Higginbotham had "laid to rest" any ambiguity that arose 
as a result of Gaudet, and therefore, courts must look to 
DORSA's schedule of beneficiaries to determine who is a bene-
ficiary entitled to recover loss of society damages in a Moragne 
271. 323 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 949 (1964); see infra 
notes 330-35 and accompanying text for a discussion on Igneri. 
272. Nygaard, 701 F.2d at 79. 
273. Id. at 80. 
274. Id. 
275. See id. at 79-80. 
276. 558 F. Supp. 364 (W.O. Wash. 1983). 
277. Weyer v. ABC Charterers, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 364, 364-67 (W.O. Wash. 
1983). 
278. The decedent was the charterer of a pleasure boat, and thus was a non-
seaman. See Weyer, 558 F.2d at 365; McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 
337, 355 (1991). 
279. Weyer, 558 F.2d at 365. 
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action.280 The court expressly declined to fashion a federal 
common law schedule of beneficiaries different from 
DORSA.281 Thus, the court chose the policy of uniformity 
over the humanitarian policy when it rejected the ex-wife's 
argument that restricting recovery for wrongful death to spous-
es, children, and dependent relatives would "unjustly exclude a 
large number of beneficiaries who are truly dependent upon [a] 
decedent and who suffer a pecuniary 10ss."282 
Two years later, the Ninth Circuit considered Evich v. 
Connelly.283 Evich involved a general maritime wrongful 
death action by the non-dependent brothers of a seaman who 
perished when the fishing vessel he worked aboard sank after 
striking rocks off the coast of Alaska.284 The court held that 
non-dependent siblings of a deceased seaman could not main-
tain a Moragne action absent a showing of financial dependen-
cy on the decedent.285 After looking to the Jones Act's sched-
ule of beneficiaries, and citing Glod for the proposition that the 
Jones Act did not provide standing for non-dependent siblings, 
the court concluded that no claim for wrongful death could be 
maintained under the Jones Act.286 The court determined 
that the brothers could not bring a wrongful death claim under 
general maritime law, because DORSA's schedule of beneficia-
ries precluded non-dependent relatives from recovery.287 The 
court, absent a reason for distinguishing non-seamen and sea-
men cases, cited both Glod and Weyer reasoning that Moragne 
actions were not allowed when brought by persons not included 
in DORSA's schedule of beneficiaries.28B Thus, the court con-
cluded, recovery for maritime wrongful death under general 
maritime law would require the seaman's brothers to prove 
280. [d. at 366. 
281. [d. at 366-67. 
282. [d. at 366. 
283. 759 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that by analogy to DOHSA, siblings 
must prove dependency to recover damages in a general maritime wrongful death 
action). 
284. Evich v. Connelly, 759 F.2d 1432, 1433-34 (9th Cir. 1985) (incorporating 
the facts of its companion case, Berg v. Chevron). See Berg v. Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc., 759 F.2d 1425, 1427-29 (9th Cir. 1985). 
285. Evich, 759 F.2d at 1432-33. 
286. [d. at 1433. 
287. [d. at 1433-34. 
288. See id. 
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that they were dependent relatives.2B9 
Consistent with the analysis applied in Glod, Nygaard, 
Weyer and Evich, the Ninth Circuit decided Bergen v. FIV St. 
Patrick.290 The issue was whether punitive damages were 
available under general maritime law to supplement Jones Act 
and DOHSA remedies.291 However, the analysis is applicable 
in deciding whether to award loss of society under general 
maritime law, because punitive damages, like loss of society, 
are non-pecuniary, and are therefore not generally allowed 
when either of the federal remedial statutes apply.292 
Bergen involved the abandonment of a fishing vessel by 
her crew.293 The fishing vessel had been rolled on its side in a 
storm while operating on the high seas in the Gulf of Alas-
ka.294 When the vessel took on water, the unlicensed and un-
qualified master ordered her evacuated.295 As a result, ten of 
the twelve crewmembers died of exposure.296 The boat was 
later recovered still afloat.297 The Ninth Circuit disallowed 
punitive damages against the vessel's owners, who knew the 
boat's captain was unqualified, because Congress intended 
DOHSA to preempt non-pecuniary damages when it ap-
plied.29B The court cited Higginbotham, reasoning that "Con-
gress did not limit DOHSA beneficiaries to recovery of their 
pecuniary losses in order to encourage the creation of a non-
pecuniary supplement.,,299 The court concluded that when a 
DOHSA claim is joined with a Jones Act claim, neither statute 
may be supplemented by the general maritime law.30o 
The court in Bergen had cause to consider dependency as 
289. Id. at 1433-34. 
290. 816 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1987). 
291. Bergen v. FN St. Patrick, 816 F.2d 1345, 1347 (9th Cir. 1987). 
292. See id. at 1345-50. 
293. Id. at 1346-47. 
294. Id. at 1347. 
295. Id. 
296. Bergen, 816 F.2d at 1347. 
297. Id. 
298. Id. at 1347-50. 
299. Id. at 1349. 
300. [d. 
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it affects recovery for loss of support under DORSA.30l In ad-
dressing the issue, the trial court had made a specific finding 
of fact that the quadriplegic mother and totally disabled father 
of one of the deceased seamen were entitled to the pecuniary 
value of the seaman's lost support.302 The parents of the oth-
er seamen were denied recovery for loss of support, because 
the Ninth Circuit deemed the evidence on the record insuffi-
cient to prove parental dependency.303. With regard to loss of 
society, the court commented in dicta, "[w]e recognize the par-
ents tragic loss of love and companionship from their deceased 
children. But loss of society is non-pecuniary and therefore not 
recoverable. "304 
In 1993, the Ninth Circuit decided Smith v. Trinidad 
Corp.305 Smith involved a claim for loss of society brought by 
the wife of a Jones Act seaman.306 The Smith court held that 
wives of injured seamen could not recover for non-pecuniary 
loss under the Jones Act or general maritime law.307 The 
court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the shipowner 
noting that the Supreme Court's decision in Miles changed the 
law which previously allowed beneficiaries of seamen to recov-
er for loss of society in unseaworthiness claims brought under 
general maritime law.30s The Ninth Circuit stated that "[t]he 
Supreme Court in Miles . .. precluded actions for loss of soci-
ety under the Jones Act, ... and [under] general admiralty 
law.,,309 The court also noted that it was following the Fifth 
Circuit which had recently held that previous cases allowing 
loss of society to seamen's wives under general maritime law 
301. Bergen, 816 F.2d at 1350-51. 
302. [d. at 1350. 
303. 1d.; but cf. Earles 11, 26 F.3d at 914-17 (unconditionally extending recovery 
for loss of society to the parents of non-seamen under maritime law). See infra 
notes on 534-43 and accompanying text for a discussion on factors admiralty 
courts might consider in determining whether a beneficiary could recover for loss 
of society. 
304. Bergen, 816 F.2d at 1350. 
305. 992 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the wife of an injured seaman 
could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime law). 
306. Smith v. Trinidad Corp., 992 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1993). 
307. [d. There is no distinction between fatal and non-fatal i~uries when 
awarding loss of society damages under general maritime law. Cater v. Placid Oil, 
760 F. Supp. 568, 571 (E.D. La. 1991). 
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were overruled by Miles. 310 The court concluded, "[w]e agree 
with the Fifth Circuit's [broad] reading of Miles and affirm 
summary judgment."311 
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Smith, in accord with Kline 
v. Maritrans CP, Inc.,312 decided within the Third Circuit, il-
lustrates the state of the law, post-Miles, regarding seamen's 
recovery for loss of society.313 Against this background the 
Ninth Circuit considered Earles II in the non-seaman context, 
splitting from the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits as to 
whether, if loss of society damages are allowed, recovery may 
be extended to non-dependent parents of non-seamen consis-
tent with both special solicitude and uniformity.314 
3. The First, Second, Third and Sixth Circuits: Reconciling 
the Aims of Uniformity and Special Solicitude 
The doctrinal analysis of the First, Second, Third, and 
Sixth Circuits are similar in that they focus on the status of 
the decedent as a seaman or non-seaman, and apply both the 
doctrine of uniformity and special solicitude, ensuring that 
remedies available to the beneficiaries of seamen are either 
uniform or not less than those allowed to the beneficiaries of 
non-seamen. Moreover, when deciding whether to award loss of 
society, these circuits look to the general maritime law and 
decline to distinguish between seamen and non-seamen cases, 
thereby adhering to a dependency rule. 
310. Id. 
311. Id. 
312. 791 F. Supp. 455 (D. Del. 1992); see infra notes 324-29 and accompanying 
text for a discussion on Kline. 
313. See Smith, 992 F.2d at 996; see also Kline v. Maritrans CP, Inc., 791 F. 
Supp. 455, 462 (D. Del. 1992). See generally, Miles, 498 U.S. at 33 (holding that 
beneficiaries of seaman can not recover for loss of society). 
314. See Earles II, 26 F.3d at 915-17; see supra notes 10, 136-37 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion on the split among circuits. 
48
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol25/iss1/6
1995] ADMIRALTY LAW 81 
a. Seamen 
Since the Supreme Court decided Gaudet, applying the 
humanitarian policy of general maritime law to introduce loss 
of society damages into admiralty, the Court has decided Miles, 
re-affirming the need for admiralty uniformity.315 In the same 
year the Supreme Court decided Miles, a district court within 
the First Circuit considered Rollins v. Peterson Builders, 
Inc.316 The court in Rollins, like the Ninth Circuit in Earles 
II, declined to follow the Fifth Circuit's financial dependency 
rule, and thus sought to extend loss of society to the non-de-
pendent IPother of a woman317 killed by electrocution while 
working as a crewmember aboard an academic· research ves-
sel.318 First, the court looked to the language of the Supreme 
Court's decisions in Moragne and Gaudet to determine that the 
defendants' reliance on the word "dependent" did not evince 
the Supreme Court's intention to preclude non-dependents 
from recovering loss of society, especially in light of the broad 
nature of the damages and the principle of special solici-
tude.319 The court then considered Miles v. Melrose which had 
not yet been affirmed by the Supreme Court and concluded 
that, because at that time, loss of society was allowed to the 
spouse of a deceased seaman, it would be consistent with the 
principle of special solicitude to extend the same remedy to the 
non-dependent parent of a deceased seaman who died without 
a spouse.320 Notwithstanding its comprehensive analysis, the 
Rollins court was ultimately compelled to grant the 
defendant's motion in limine to strike the plaintiffs claim for 
loss of society when the Supreme Court decided Miles v. Apex 
Marine Corp.321 
315. Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 587-91; Miles, 498 U.S. at 26-27 (noting that admiral-
ty courts that "supplement" statutory remedies in maritime wrongful death actions 
must do so to achieve uniform vindication of national policy). 
316. 761 F. Supp. 918 (D.R.I. 1990). 
317. The decedent was considered a "seaman" under the Jones Act. Rollins v. 
Peterson Builders, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 918, 920 (D.R.I. 1990). See supra note 5 and 
accompanying text for a discussion on seaman status. 
318. Rollins, 761 F. Supp. at 922-24. 
319. Id. at 922-23. Cf Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17. 
320. Rollins, 761 F. Supp. at 923-24. Cf Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17, 917 n.18. 
321. Rollins, 761 F. Supp. at 929. 
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Although loss of society was denied in Rollins, the case is 
significant to the background of the dependency issue, because 
it illustrates the minority approach ultimately utilized by the 
Ninth Circuit in Earles II.322 Moreover, when the denial of 
loss of society damages compelled by the seaman status of the 
decedent in Rollins is contrasted with the substantial awards 
for loss of society in Earles II, the anomaly shaped by the 
Ninth Circuit between seamen's recovery· and non-seamen's 
recovery is accentuated.323 
In Kline v. Maritrans CP, Inc.,324 the District Court of 
Delaware, citing Miles, held that the non-dependent beneficia-
ries of a deceased seaman could not recover loss of society 
damages.325 The court denied recovery to the parents of a 
twenty-eight year old Tugboat Mate who drowned after he 
slipped on ice and fell overboard while his vessel was moored 
in Fall River, Massachusetts.326 The court cited the Ninth 
Circuit's decision in Bergen v. FIV St. Patrick,327 a DORSA 
case, for the proposition that to recover any damages under the 
general maritime law, parents of a seaman must show de pen-
dency.328 Kline illustrates Miles' effect on the elements of 
damages allowed to beneficiaries of seamen, and represents the 
state of the law, post-Miles, regarding seamen's recovery for 
322. See Rollins, 761 F. Supp. at 921-24; Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17. The 
Ninth Circuit in Earles II misrepresented the ultimate holding in Rollins, which 
denied non-dependent parents of a seaman standing to recover loss of society un-
der general maritime law by citing it for the proposition that loss of society could 
be awarded to the beneficiaries of non-seamen regardless of dependency. See Earles 
II, 26 F.3d at 917 n.18. An accurate reading of Rollins reveals the district court's 
rationale for attempting to extend recovery for loss of society to the non-dependent 
mother was that: 
Gaudet . . . already determined that . . . [special] solici-
tude warrants an award of loss of society damages to a 
spouse of a seaman who is . . . killed. It is a small step 
indeed to find that the same solicitude should extend to 
the parents of a deceased seaman. . . . 
Rollins, 761 F. Supp. at 924 (emphasis added); see also KIPLING, supra note 1, at 
216. 
323. See Rollins, 761 F. Supp. at 923-24; Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17; see also 
infra notes 450-61 for a comparison of Rollins with Earles II. 
324. 791 F. Supp. 455 (D. Del. 1992). 
325. Kline v. Maritrans CP, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 455, 461 (D. Del. 1992). 
326. 1d. at 457. 
327. 816 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1987); see supra notes 290-304 and accompanying 
text for a discussion on Bergen. 
328. See Kline, 791 F. Supp. 462. 
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wrongful death.329 
b. Non-Seamen 
In 1963, the Second Circuit decided Igneri u. Compagnie de 
Transports Oceaniques,330 a longshoreman case which, in the 
context of personal injury rather than wrongful death, involved 
the precise issue presented to the Supreme Court ten years 
later in Gaudet.33l The court in Igneri held that the wife of a 
longshoreman injured in New York territorial waters could not 
recover for loss of society.332 After identifying the issue as one 
of first impression, the court determined that the common law 
was inconclusive, and thus looked to maritime law.333 First, 
Judge Friendly noted that Congress did not authorize recovery 
for loss of society in a seaman's claim under the Jones Act.334 
The court then reasoned it could not create an anomaly nor 
discriminate against seamen by putting maritime shore 
workers' wives in a better position than seamen's wives.335 
The court announced, "[w]e can think of no reason why Con-
gress, having ruled out a maritime claim ... for loss of [soci-
ety] by the spouse of a negligently injured seaman, would wish 
the courts to construct one for the spouse of a negligently in-
jured [longshoreman] ."336 
Estate of Fajardo u. Maersk Line Agency337 confirmed the 
basic methodology used by the Second Circuit in Igneri when 
deciding whether to award recovery for loss of society in gener-
al maritime law tort actions despite the intervening rule of 
329. Kline, 791 F. Supp. at 461; see Miles, 498 U.S. at 33. 
330. 323 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 949 (1964). 
331. Igneri v. Compagnie de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257, 267 (2d Cir. 
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 949 (1964). 
332. Id. There is no distinction between fatal and non-fatal injuries when 
awarding loss of society damages under general maritime law. Cater v. Placid Oil, 
760 F. Supp. 568, 571 (E.D. La. 1991). 
333. Igneri, 323 F.2d at 258-59. 
334. Id. at 266. 
335. Id. at 267. 
336. Id. 
337. 1989 A.M.C. 1923 (D. Md. 1988) (not otherwise reported). See Timothy R. 
Lord, Drowning In Unoccupied Waters: Estate of Fajardo v. Maersk Line Agency, 
15 TvL. MAR. L.J. 423 (1991). 
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Gaudet which allowed loss of society damages.338 Significant-
ly, the court in Fajardo declined to distinguish between sea-
men and non-seamen cases when deciding whether to award 
loss of society to the non-dependent parents of a minor339 who 
drowned in Chesapeake Bay due to large swells created from 
the wake of defendant's passing container ship.340 Since nei-
ther DORSA nor the Jones Act otherwise applied, the court 
first looked to maritime case law for guidance, as the Second 
Circuit had done in Igneri. 341 In doing so, the court relied on 
the Fifth Circuit's decisions in Sistrunk v. Circle Bar Drill-
ing342 and Truehart v. Blandon343 for the proposition that, 
post-Gaudet, the state of maritime wrongful death favored 
awarding loss of society to a decedent's dependent beneficia-
ries.344 Next, the court noted the Supreme Court's instruction 
to lower courts to look to the federal maritime statutes when 
awarding damages under general maritime law. 345 The court 
quoted Higginbotham, "DORSA should be the courts' primary 
guide as they refine the non-statutory death remedy, ... be-
cause of the interest in uniformity ... ."346 Therefore, al-
though the maritime statutory scheme did not apply, the court 
looked to it for guidance concluding that, because neither 
DOHSA nor the Jones Act permitted recovery of loss of society 
awards by non-dependent parents, neither did the general 
maritime law.347 
In Anderson v. Whittiker Corp.,348 the Sixth Circuit con-
338. See Estate of Fajardo v. Maersk Line Agency, 1989 A.M.C. 1923, 1926-28 
(D. Md. 1988) (not otherwise reported). 
339. The decedent was a non-seaman. See id. 
340. [d. at 1924, 1927. 
341. [d. at 1926. 
342. 770 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that the non-dependent parents of 
two seamen killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages 
under general maritime law), reh'g denied, 775 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 1019 (1986); see supra notes 149-59 and accompanying text for a 
discussion on Sistrunk. 
343. 672 F. Supp. 929 (E.D. La 1987) (holding that the non-dependent family 
members of a non-seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of 
society damages under general maritime law); see supra notes 168-83 and accom-
panying text for a discussion on Truehart. 
344. Fajardo, 1989 A.M.C. at 1926 (emphasis added). 
345. [d. 
346. [d. (quoting Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 624). 
347. See id. at 1927. 
348. 894 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that the non-dependent parents of 
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sidered a situation where four men died when a boat they were 
shuttling across Lake Michigan was swamped.349 After deter-
mining that the decedents were non-seamen, the district court 
ruled that the widows and children of two of the decedents 
were entitled to loss of society.35o However, the court denied 
identical claims by the non-dependent parents of the other two 
victims.351 The Sixth Circuit affirmed noting that the district 
court's decision relied on the "twin aims" of maritime law, 
"achieving uniformity in the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction 
and. . . providing special solicitude to seamen. ,,362 The Sixth 
Circuit reasoned that the pecuniary limitation on damages 
under the Jones Act and DORSA led to the conclusion that to 
deny loss of society would provide more uniformity to admiral-
ty jurisdiction.353 Furthermore, the court emphasized that 
since non-dependent parents could not recover loss of society 
under either of the federal wrongful death statutes, and the 
decedents were non-seamen, its decision did not hinder the 
aim of providing special solicitude.354 Therefore, the Sixth 
Circuit's decision was in accord with the district court's holding 
in Fajardo. 355 Anderson followed the Fifth Circuit's holding in 
Miles v. Melrose,366 as well as the Supreme Court's decisions 
in Moragne and Gaudet, to advance dependency as the critical 
factor in determining whether to award loss of society damag-
es.357 
non·seamen killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages 
under general maritime law), affg, 692 F. Supp. 764 (W.D. Mich 1988); but see 
Earles II, 26 F.3d at 916 n.14. 
349. Anderson v. Whittaker Corp., 894 F.2d 804, 806·07 (6th Cir. 1990). 
350. Id. at 807. 
351. 1d. 
352. Id. at 811. 
353. Id. 
354. Anderson, 894 F.2d at 811; but see Earles II, 26 F.3d at 915 (reasoning 
that parents were DOHSA beneficiaries regardless of dependency). 
355. See Anderson, 894 F.2d at 811; Fajardo, 1989 A.M.C. at 1924-28. 
356. 882 F.2d 976, 989 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the non·dependent parent 
of a seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages 
under general maritime law), affd sub nom. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 
19 (1990). 
357. Anderson, 894 F.2d at 811-12. 
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Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd.,3sS represents 
the present view of the Second Circuit which is in accord with 
the clear majority of courts on the loss of society dependency 
issue in the post-Miles era.359 In Wahlstrom, the parents of a 
seventeen year old boy, killed when the jet ski he was operat-
ing collided with a power boat on the Themes River in Con-
necticut, brought a general maritime wrongful death claim 
against the jet ski's manufacturer.36o The Second Circuit held 
that the non-dependent parents of a non-seaman killed in 
territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages.361 
The Second Circuit reviewed the background of maritime 
wrongful death recovery and noted that no Supreme Court case 
supported non-dependent beneficiaries recovering loss of soci-
ety, and neither did DOHSA nor the Jones Act when they 
applied.362 Recognizing, however, that the federal maritime 
wrongful death statutes did not apply, the court looked to 
federal court precedent on the issue and found, "the over-
whelming majority of the pertinent federal decisions [hold] 
that nondependent parents cannot recover damages for loss of 
society in a general maritime [wrongful death] action. "363 
In Wahlstrom, the Second Circuit squarely addressed its 
policy for awarding non-pecuniary damages based on financial 
dependency, justifying the dependency rule by using three 
species of uniformity.364 Prior to affirming its adherence to a 
dependency rule, however, the court; dismissed a principal 
argument against their policy.365 The court noted that some 
other courts did not impose a dependency requirement when 
deciding whether to award non-pecuniary damages, such as 
358. 4 F.3d 1084 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the non·dependent parents of a 
non·seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages 
under general maritime law), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1060 (1994); but see Earles 
II, 26 F.3d at 916 n.14. 
359. Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 4 F.3d 1084, 1091·93 (2d Cir. 
1993); see also Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., No. 93·7490, 1994 WL 
685690, at *3·4 (2d Cir. Dec. 5, 1994); Air Disaster at Lockerbie Scotland on De· 
cember 21, 1988, 37 F.3d 804, 828·30 (2d Cir. 1994). 
360. Wahlstrom, 4 F.3d at 1086. 
361. [d. at 1093. 
362. [d. at 1091. 
363. [d. at 1092. 
364. [d. at 1092·93. 
365. Wahlstrom, 4 F.3d at 1092. 
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loss of society, because dependency is a pecuniary standard, 
and that therefore, the logical foundation of such a policy was 
too irrational to be the basis of an inflexible rule.366 The court 
however continued, "[c]ountervailing concerns nevertheless 
outweigh the force of this contention."367 The Second Circuit's 
first policy concern was that uniformity among admiralty 
courts prevai1.368 The court announced that "[i]t would hardly 
promote the uniform administration of admiralty actions for 
this circuit to adopt a rule in conflict with almost every decided 
federal case on this issue.,,369 Second, the court reasoned that 
in the interest of uniformity between remedies for seamen and 
non-seamen, loss of society damages could not be extended to 
the non-dependent parents of a non-seaman, because the Su-
preme Court in Miles denied such recovery to the parents of 
seamen, the "wards of admiralty," who therefore are entitled to 
admiralty's greatest recovery.370 Third, the court sought uni-
formity with Supreme Court precedent noting that extending 
the rule of Gaudet to the non-dependent parents of non-seamen 
killed in territorial waters would be inconsistent with 
Miles. 371 The court reasoned that because Gaudet was limited 
to its facts in Miles, thereby restricting loss of society to long-
shoremen in territorial waters, Supreme Court precedent evi-
denced a trend toward restricting loss of society as an element 
of damages in maritime cases.372 Thus, the clear trend within 
the Second, as well as the Third and Sixth Circuits, is to 
award loss of society damages to the parents of non-seamen 
when not precluded by statute (i.e., in territorial waters), but 
366. [d.; see also Zicherman, 1994 WL 685690, at "'3 (noting that "[nlo doubt [a 
dependencyl rule denies recovery to some deserving parties; non·dependent survi-
vors may feel the loss of a loved one as keenly as dependent survivors"); Randall 
v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 13 F.3d 888, 903 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that, "[iln our 
view, the law of this circuit does not unequivocally limit recovery of loss of society 
damages for the wrongful death of a parent to children who are financially depen-
dent on the decedent"); but cf. Walker v. Braus, 862 F. Supp. 527, 535 (E.D. La. 
1994) (recognizing that by concluding loss of society damages are not allowed in a 
general maritime wrongful death action, "implies that the dependency requirement 
for recovering loss of society damages under general maritime law is no longer 
viable"), remand before decision, 995 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1993). 
367. Wahlstrom, 4 F.3d at 1092; but see Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17. 
368. Wahlstrom, 4 F.3d at 1092. 
369. [d.; but see Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17. 
370. See Wahlstrom, 4 F.3d at 1092. 
371. [d. 
372. [d. at 1092-93. 
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only when there is a showing of financial dependency. Against 
this background, the Ninth Circuit published Earles II.373 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In Sutton v. Earles374 ("Earles Ir) the Ninth Circuit em-
phasized that it was not constrained by the Jones Act or 
DOHSA, nor compelled by the Supreme Court's recent decision 
in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.,375 to impose restrictions on 
general maritime law death remedies sought on behalf of non-
seamen who perish within territorial waters.376 The court ex-
pressly asserted that Miles did not control.377 Further, the 
court disagreed with the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits' 
broad interpretations of the uniformity rationale of Miles.378 
Thus, finding itself free to disregard the uniformity component 
of Miles, the court exercised its own expansive role in develop-
ing maritime law, and consistent with its power to fashion 
liberal remedies in admiralty, extended recovery for loss of 
society to the non-dependent parents of non-seamen.379 
In awarding damages, the Ninth Circuit had to transit a 
mine field of guiding admiralty law principles.380 The court 
exposed the fact that distinctions that make recovery in mari-
time wrongful death actions anomalous.381 As a result, the 
373. See Earles II, 26 F.3d at 915-17. 
374. Sutton v. Earles ("Earles II"), 26 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 1994), remand before 
appeal, Earles v. United States ("Earles 1"), 935 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1991). 
375. 498 U.S. 19 (1990). 
376. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 915, 917. 
377. See id. at 917. 
378. ld. at 916-17; see also Walker v. Braus, 861 F. Supp. 527, 536-37 (E.D. La. 
1994) (declining to follow Earles ll), remand before decision, 995 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 
1993). 
379. See Earles II, 26 F.3d at 917. 
380. See id. at 914-17. Among the principles the court dealt with were: unifor-
mity, special solicitude, and dependency. See id. Dependency is a consideration, 
because, as two prominent commentators in the field have noted, "since pecuniary 
loss to the beneficiary is the basis for recovery [under the remedial maritime stat-
utes] the dependency idea cannot be lost sight of." GRANT GILMORE AND CHARLES 
L. BLACK, JR., THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY, § 6-30, at 361-62 n.174 (2d ed. 1975). 
381. See Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17. Factors that may effect anomalous recov-
ery are: (1) situs of the casualty, territorial waters versus high seas; (2) status of 
the decedent, seaman versus non-seaman; and (3) status of the beneficiary, depen-
dent versus non-dependent. See id. 
56
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol25/iss1/6
1995] ADMIRALTY LAW 89 
Ninth Circuit illustrated the circumstance that as remedies 
develop in general maritime law, antiquated statutory con-
straints on damages for beneficiaries of seamen become in-
creasingly more unjust, thus highlighting the need for legisla-
tive relief.382 
A. GENERAL MARITIME WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS ALLOW 
AWARDS FOR Loss OF SOCIETY 
In Earles II, the Ninth Circuit began its analysis of dam-
ages by summarizing the history of wrongful death in mari-
time jurisprudence.383 After noting examples of judicially 
sanctioned non-uniform recovery throughout the history of 
maritime wrongful death law, the Ninth Circuit agreed with 
the appellees' argument that Gaudet had already decided the 
precise question presented, and asserted that Gaudet con-
trolled its decision.384 Therefore, the court concluded, loss of 
society is authorized when, as in Gaudet, a non-seaman is 
killed in territorial waters.385 The court reasoned that, al-
though both DOHSA and the Jones Act limit damages to pecu-
niary loss for maritime wrongful deaths, DOHSA did not apply 
because the deaths took place in territorial waters, and the 
Jones Act did not apply because the decedents were not sea-
men.386 The court distinguished both Higginbotham and 
Miles by the fact that the remedial maritime statutory scheme 
applied in those cases, whereas in Earles II, it did not.387 
Therefore, the court reasoned that it must follow the general 
maritime rule which, under Gaudet, allowed loss of society 
damages.388 The Ninth Circuit thus concluded that the bene-
ficiaries of non-seamen killed in territorial waters could recov-
er loss of society as an element of damages in a general mari-
382. See Earles II, 26 F.3d at 917; see supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
383. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-15; see supra notes 68-148 and accompanying text 
for a discussion on the history of maritime wrongful death jurisprudence. 
384. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 915; see also Opening brief for Appellee at 37, Sutton 
v. Earles ("Earles II"), 26 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 1994) (No. 92-55548). 
385. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 915 (emphasis added). 
386. ld. 
387. ld. In Higginbotham, DORSA applied because the death occurred on the 
high seas, while in Miles, the Jones Act applied because the decedent was a sea-
man.ld. 
388. See id. 
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time wrongful death action.3s9 
B. Loss OF SOCIETY AWARDS Do NOT REQUIRE DEPENDENCY 
1. General Maritime Law Allows Parents to Recover for 
Wrongful Death Regardless of Dependency 
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the trial court's finding that 
the parents of non-seamen were entitled to loss of society with-
out proving they were financially dependent upon the dece-
dents.39o The court framed the issue as one of standing.391 
The court looked to DORSA and the Jones Act for guidance as 
to who has standing to recover damages when a non-seaman 
perishes within territorial waters.392 The Ninth Circuit rea-
soned that parents had standing to recover damages under the 
Jones Act, regardless of dependency, when, as in Earles II, 
there is no surviving spouse or child.393 The Ninth Circuit 
then agreed with the Second Circuit's reasoning in Wahlstrom 
v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus. Ltd.,394 which used DORSA's 
schedule of beneficiaries, which includes a "wife, husband, 
parent, child or dependent relative," to reject dependency as 
the critical factor.395 The court reasoned that, since Gaudet 
instructs that loss of society damages are allowed in a Moragne 
action when the Jones Act and DORSA do not apply, and fed-
eral courts generally look to DORSA's schedule of beneficiaries 
when deciding who has standing to recover damages in a 
Moragne action, the parents were entitled to loss of society as 
an element of damages regardless of dependency.396 
389. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 915. 
390. Id. at 915-17. 
391. Id. at 915. 
392. Id. 
393. Id. 
394. 4 F.3d 1084 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the non-dependent parents of a 
non-seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages 
under general maritime law), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1060 (1994). 
395. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 916 (emphasis added); see also 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-
68 (1988); Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 4 F.3d 1084, 1090-91 (2d 
Cir. 1993). 
396. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 916; but see infra notes 534-43 and accompanying 
text for a discussion on factors admiralty courts might consider in determining 
whether a beneficiary could recover for 108s of society. 
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2. Dependency Is Not a Factor When Awarding Loss of 
Society Damages in a General Maritime Wrongful Death 
Action 
The government relied on a dependency rule, arguing: (1) 
that in Higginbotham, the Supreme Court dared litigants to 
challenge the propriety of loss of society damages in the future 
if they became "a substantial part of the survivor's recov-
ery,"397 (2) that a broad reading of the uniformity rationale 
expressed by the Court in both Higginbotham and Miles that 
asserted recovery should be uniform between the federal stat-
utes and Moragne actions was required, and (3) for adherence 
to the language of Miles which dictates that lower courts look 
to the Jones Act and DOHSA for policy guidance.39B The 
Ninth Circuit noted that Higginbotham sanctioned non-uni-
form recovery of damages between territorial waters cases and 
high seas cases in order to comply with DOHSA's limitation to 
pecuniary damages.399 The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the 
government's claim that post-Miles, courts must look to both 
the Jones Act and DOHSA for policy guidance, and likewise 
deny loss of society damages to non-dependents.4oo Indeed, 
the Ninth Circuit challenged the government's reliance on a 
dependency rule explaining that the dependency policy was 
derived from dicta in Higginbotham and Miles. 401 
397. In Earles II, loss of society damages were a substantial part of the 
parents' recovery. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. See generally W. 
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 127, at 952 n.81 (5th ed. 
1984) (noting that the Supreme Court's dicta in Higginbotham, whether awards for 
loss of society must be primarily symbolic rather than a substantial portion of 
recovery, has not yet been decided). 
398. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 915·16. Both statutes limit recovery to pecuniary 
damages. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988); 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761·68 (1988). 
399. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 915·16; see also Opening brief for Appellant at 40·45, 
Earles II (No. 92·55548). 
400. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 915·16. 
401. ld. at 915·16. 
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3. Uniformity of Recovery in a General Maritime Wrongful 
Death Action is Not Compelled by Supreme Court 
Jurisprudence Unless Damages are Otherwise Controlled 
by Statute 
The Ninth Circuit synthesized the Supreme Court's rea-
soning under Gaudet-Higginbotham-Miles, deriving the rule 
that uniformity of recovery was a factor in a Moragne action 
only if the damages awarded conflicted directly with either of 
the federal maritime wrongful death statutes.402 The court 
noted, "the results in Higginbotham and Miles were clearly 
dictated by statute, and neither statute limits the damages 
recoverable for death in territorial waters that were authorized 
by Gaudet."403 Thus, the court's reasoning suggests that when 
the federal maritime statutory scheme does not apply, the 
maritime case law that interprets it does not either.404 By 
reasoning that both Higginbotham and Miles were dictated by 
statute, the Ninth Circuit dismissed those holdings' emphasis 
on uniformity, thereby making headway toward the conclusion 
in Earles II that loss of society damages could be awarded 
regardless of dependency. 405 
4. Uniformity and Special Solicitude Do Not Preclude Non-
Seamen's Beneficiaries from Recovering Damages Denied to 
Beneficiaries of Seamen 
The Ninth Circuit addressed the assertion that the court 
should adopt the government's approach because it is the same 
approach to loss of society used by the Second, Fifth, and Sixth 
402. [d. at 916 (emphasis added). 
403. [d. 
404. See id.; but see Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 26-27 (1990) 
(noting that admiralty courts that "supplement" statutory remedies in maritime 
wrongful death actions must do so to achieve uniform vindication of national poli-
cy); Mobil Oil v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978) (noting that since Con-
gress has never enacted a comprehensive maritime code, courts that award mari-
time wrongful death damages must do so in a way that preserves the uniformity 
of maritime law); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 397-409 (1970) 
(noting that when awarding non-statutory remedies, the courts should look to 
DOHSA and the Jones Act for guidance). 
405. See Earles II, 26 F.3d at 916-17. 
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Circuits.406 The court disagreed with the Second Circuit's 
holding in Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., which 
declined to award loss of society damages to the non-dependent 
parents of a non-seaman killed in territorial waters.407 The 
Ninth Circuit explained that the Second Circuit's reasoning in 
. Wahlstrom was in the interest of uniformity between recovery 
for the deaths of seamen and non-seamen in territorial wa-
ters.408 The court noted that the Second Circuit had consid-
ered the interest of special solicitude to seamen by reasoning 
that the recovery allowed to beneficiaries of non-seamen should 
not be more generous than the recovery allowed to seamen's 
beneficiaries which is limited.to pecuniary loss under the Jones 
Act, and therefore precludes loss of society damages.409 
The Ninth Circuit declared itself free from the guiding 
principle of uniformity that the Second Circuit had found com-
pelling in Wahlstrom, because, unlike the Second Circuit, the 
Ninth Circuit found that Miles did not contro1.410 The court 
reiterated that, because the facts of Miles involved a seaman, 
the Court in Miles .was constrained to limit damages under the 
Jones Act, whereas the court in Earles II, dealing with non-
seamen, was free to fashion its own remedy, even if inconsis-
tent with the remedial statutes.41l It bolstered this assertion 
by pointing out that the Supreme Court created inconsistent 
recovery for death of non-seamen between territorial waters 
and the high seas by its holdings in Gaudet and 
Higginbotham.412 Thus, because the decedents in Earles II 
were non-seamen, the principle of statutory uniformity as 
applied in the seaman context under Miles was not a compel-
ling factor in the court's analysis.413 
406. Id. at 916; Opening brief for Appellant at 40-45, Earles II (No. 92-55548). 
407. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 916; see also Walker v. Braus, 861 F. Supp. 527, 536-
37 (E.D. La. 1994) (declining to follow Earles 11), remand before decision, 995 F.2d 
77 (5th Cir. 1993); see supra notes 10, 358-73 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion on Wahlstrom. 
408. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 916-17. 
409. Id. The Ninth Circuit clarified that the Second Circuit's decision in 
Wahlstrom was based on the Wahlstrom court's expansive interpretation of the 
uniformity principle that the Supreme Court declared in Miles. Id. at 917. 
410. Id. 
411. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 917. 
412. Id. 
413. See id. at 915-17. 
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5. The "Humane and Liberal Character of Proceedings in 
Admiralty" Justify Extending Loss Of Society Damages to 
Non-Dependent Beneficiaries of Non-Seamen 
The Ninth Circuit declined to interpret the law as drawing 
any distinction between dependents and non-dependents for 
the purpose of awarding loss of society in a Moragne action for 
death of non-seamen in territorial waters.414 The court noted, 
"it better becomes the humane and liberal character of pro-
ceedings in admiralty to give than to withhold the remedy, 
when not required to withhold it by established and inflexible 
rules.,,415 Implicit in the court's reasoning was recognition of 
its own special role in the evolution of maritime jurisprudence 
as not merely supplemental, but appointed with the power to 
develop substantive rules.416 Therefore, although it was a 
matter of first impression for the Ninth Circuit, the court 
found that because the issue was not directly preempted by 
statute, extending loss of society to non-dependents was consis-
tent with its authority to fashion liberal remedies in the gener-
al maritime law.417 Moreover, the court concluded that any 
lack of uniformity created by Earles II was the result of the 
clash between Congress' statutory enactments under the Jones 
Act and DORSA, and the Supreme Court's rules of decision in 
Moragne and Gaudet.418 
V. CRITIQUE 
In Earles II, the Ninth Circuit held that the beneficiaries 
of non-seamen killed in territorial waters may recover loss of 
society damages regardless of dependency.419 The Supreme 
Court has ruled that beneficiaries of Jones Act seamen cannot 
recover loss of society damages.42o The Earles II decision cre-
414. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 917. 
415. Id. (quoting The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909, 910 (C.C.D. Md. 1865». 
416. See id.; see also In re Oswego Barge Corp., 644 F.2d 327, 335-36 (2d Cir. 
1981) (noting that the Supreme Court has approved the creation of new rights 
pursuant to federal court-made maritime law more forcefully than in other areas 
of federal court-made law), reh'g denied, 673 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1982). 
417. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 917. 
418. Id. 
419. Sutton v. Earles ("Earles II"), 26 F.3d 903, 920 (9th Cir. 1994), remand 
before appeal, Earles v. United States ("Earles I"), 935 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1991). 
420. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990) (holding that the parent of 
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ated anomalous recovery within the Ninth Circuit and a split 
between the Ninth Circuit and the other circuits.421 The 
Ninth Circuit's holding, therefore, is at odds with the spirit of 
maritime uniformity.422 More disturbing, the rule is in con-
flict with the ancient maritime principle that seamen are the 
"wards of admiralty" and are therefore entitled to its most 
generous protection, special solicitude.423 
Notwithstanding the misapplication of the principles of 
uniformity and special solicitude, the Ninth Circuit's Earles II 
decision awarded loss of society damages to beneficiaries of 
non-seamen without requiring the district court to conduct a 
factual analysis of 10ss.424 Whether to award loss of society in 
maritime wrongful death law is a question that strikes at the 
heart of a greater debate in American jurisprudence: whether 
a seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages 
under general maritime law). 
421. See Walker v. Braus, 861 F. Supp. 527, 536 (E.D. La. 1994), remand before 
appeal, 995 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 989 
(5th Cir. 1989), affd sub nom. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990) 
(holding that the non-dependent parent of a seaman killed in territorial waters 
could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime law); but cf. 
Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17. See supra notes 14, 49-55 and accompanying text for 
a discussion of uniformity. 
422. See Walker v. Braus, 861 F. Supp. 527, 536 (E.D. La. 1994), remand before 
appeal, 995 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 989 
(5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the non-dependent parent of a seaman killed in terri-
torial waters could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime 
law), affd sub nom. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990); but cf. Earles 
II, 26 F.3d at 914-17. See supra notes 14, 49-55 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of uniformity. 
423. See Walker, 861 F. Supp. at 536-38 (noting that persons that sue in admi-
ralty are permitted no greater "solicitude" than seamen, and that by allowing non-
seamen recovery for loss of society that seamen's beneficiaries are not allowed, the 
Earles II court implicitly denied the driving principles behind creating a federal 
maritime law cause of action for wrongful death in the first place); see also 
Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd., 4 F.3d 1084, 1093 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(holding that the non-dependent parents of non-seamen killed in territorial waters 
could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime law due to con-
siderations of uniformity), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1060 (1994); Anderson v. 
Whittaker Corp., 894 F.2d 804, 811 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that by denying non-
dependent parents of non-seaman recovery for loss of society, the aim of special 
solicitude to seamen was not unduly effected, and that the principle of uniformity 
was furthered); cf. Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 987-89 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding 
that the non-dependent parent of a seaman killed in territorial waters could not 
recover loss of society damages under general maritime law), affd sub nom. Miles 
v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 33-37 (1990). 
424. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17. 
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the purpose of the judicial system is to compensate tort victims 
for their pecuniary loss only, or whether it is to effectuate the 
public policy of awarding damages for more intangible loss-
es.425 Although measuring the quantum of intangible losses is 
problematic, it appears that in Earles II, the Ninth Circuit was 
led to include recovery for loss of society under general mari-
time law to anyone with standing.426 Moreover, the broad 
rule adopted in Earles II now applies to all general maritime 
wrongful death cases within the Ninth Circuit.427 
A. ANOMALIES CREATED BY THE EARLES II RULE 
The Earles II damages rule leads to anomalies in maritime 
recovery within the Ninth Circuit, and among recovery allowed 
in other federal circuits, by allowing non-dependent beneficia-
ries of non-seamen to recover loss of society damages while 
dependent beneficiaries of seamen are denied such recov-
ery.428 Ironically, non-uniform recovery is precisely what led 
the Supreme Court, in Moragne, to create a cause of action for 
wrongful death of non-seamen killed in territorial waters.429 
Moreover, in Miles, the Supreme Court re-affirmed that basic 
425. See STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND 
INJURY §§ 3:1, 3:50, at 5-19, 221-39 (3rd ed. 1992). 
426. See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., No. 93-7490, 1994 WL 
685690, at *3-4 (2d Cir. Dec. 5, 1994) (remanding an award for loss of society for 
a trial on the dependency issue); Walker, 861 F. Supp. at 537-38 (holding that the 
beneficiaries of non-semen killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of 
society consistent with the guiding principle of special solicitude to seamen); Miles 
v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 33-37 (1990) (holding that the parent of a sea-
man killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages under 
general maritime law due to considerations of uniformity); cf. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 
914-17. 
427. See Earles II, 26 F.3d at 920. 
428. See Chan v. Society Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 1398, 1407 (9th Cir. 1994); 
see also Davis v. Bender Shipbuilding, 27 F.3d 426, 426-30 (9th Cir. 1994); Walker 
v. Braus, 861 F. Supp. 527, 536 (E.D. La. 1994) (noting that Miles was decided to 
remedy anomalies in maritime wrongful death recovery, and that the current non-
uniformity as a result of Earles 11 is analogous to one anomaly the Court found 
compelling when it decided to create a general maritime law cause of action for 
wrongful death in Moragne), remand before decision, 995 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1993). 
429. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 395-96 (1970) (noting that 
the Court's holding which recognized a general maritime wrongful death action 
was compelled partly to remedy the anomaly that - contrary to settled admiralty 
law tenets - Jones Act seamen were, at that time, extended less protection under 
maritime law than other suitors). 
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approach to maritime remedies when it counseled lower courts 
not to award non-uniform damages within maritime wrongful 
death actions of Jones Act seamen.430 . 
1. Anomalous Recovery Within The Ninth Circuit 
In the Ninth Circuit, the anomalous holding in Earles II 
may be illustrated by Davis v. Bender Shipbuilding,431 a case 
the Ninth Circuit decided the same month as Earles II. In 
Earles II, the court, unconstrained by either the Jones Act or 
DORSA, fashioned "humane and liberal remedies" for the 
beneficiaries of non-seamen.432 The Davis holding was signifi-
cant because the court applied the uniformity component of 
Miles broadly, declining to extend loss of future earnings in a 
survival action brought under general· maritime law on behalf 
of the estates of two deceased seamen.433 Thus, even though 
the Jones Act and DORSA did not apply, in Davis, the Ninth 
Circuit refused to extend recovery to the seamen's estates; 
whereas in Earles II, the court extended recovery for loss of 
society to the beneficiaries of non-seamen.434 
The next case the Ninth Circuit considered regarding loss 
of society damages, Chan v. Society Expeditions, Inc.,435 was 
decided on July 27, 1994. In Chan, the Ninth Circuit decided 
the issue of whether the dependent family members of a non-
430. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 33 (1990) (noting that the 
Court's holding which denied loss of society benefits to the non-dependent mother 
of a seaman killed in territorial waters restored a uniform rule applicable to all 
wrongful death actions available to seamen). 
431. 27 F.3d 426 (9th Cir. 1994). 
432. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 917. 
433. Davis v. Bender Shipbuilding, 27 F.3d. 426, 430 (9th Cir. 1994). 
434. [d. at 430. The Jones Act did not apply in Davis, because the suit was not 
against the seaman's employer, and therefore was not against a Jones Act defen-
dant. [d. 
435. 39 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994) (declining to award loss of society damages to 
the dependent family members of a non-seaman injured on the high seas because 
of DOHSA's denial of such recovery to the beneficiaries of those killed on the high 
seas, coupled with the Supreme Court's emphasis on uniformity of damages among 
maritime tort actions in Miles). It should be noted that as originally released 
Chan conflicted directly with Earles II, therefore, subsequent to July 1994, Chan 
was re-released to comport with Earles II. See Chan v. Society Expeditions, Inc., 
1994 A.M.C. 2642 (9th Cir. 1994) (reporting the Ninth Circuit's decision in Chan 
as originally released). 
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seaman could recover loss of society in a personal injury 
case.4S6 The case arose in connection with the capsizing of an 
inflatable raft which ferried passengers from a cruise ship to 
an atoll in the South Pacific, near Tahiti.437 Benny Chan, the 
injured father of the family, suffered brain damage as a result 
of the accident.43s The court held that in the interest of uni-
formity as emphasized in Miles, a seaman case, the family 
members of a non-seaman injured on the high seas could not 
recover loss of society.439 
In Chan, the Ninth Circuit noted that it must "look for 
guidance to congressional enactments in the field of maritime 
law.,,440 The court further noted it should also be guided by 
the "twin aims" of maritime law, uniformity and special solici-
tude.441 The court announced that because the accident took 
place on the high seas, the remedial provisions of DOHSA were 
instructive, and that DOHSA did not allow non-pecuniary 
damages.442 In Chan, however, DOSHA did not apply because 
the victim was injured rather than killed.443 Likewise, since 
the accident in Earles II had taken place in territorial waters, 
rather than on the high seas, DOHSA did not apply in that 
case either.444 Nevertheless, in Earles II, the Ninth Circuit 
extended recovery because DOHSA did not apply, while in 
Chan, the court declined to award loss of society damages even 
though DOHSA did not apply.445 
In concluding that loss of society was not allowed in Chan, 
a non-seaman case, the Ninth Circuit sought to serve the goal 
of uniformity of damages in maritime cases that the Supreme 
436. Chan v. Society Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 1398, 1407-08 (9th Cir. 1994). 
There is no distinction between fatal and non-fatal ir\iuries when awarding loss of 
society damages under general maritime law. Cater v. Placid Oil, 760 F. Supp. 
568, 571 (E.D. La. 1991). 
437. Chan, 39 F.3d at 1401-02. 
438. Id. 
439. Id. at 1408. 
440. Id. at 1407. 
441. Id. 
442. Chan, 39 F.3d at 1407. 
443. [d. 
444. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 915. 
445. Chan, 39 F.3d at 1408; but see Earles II, 26 F.3d at 917. 
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Court emphasized in Miles, a seaman case.446 However, faced 
with an analogous decision in Earles II, the Ninth Circuit de-
emphasized the uniformity component of Miles, because Miles 
was a seaman's case, while Earles II, involved non-seamen.447 
Yet, as in Earles II, the accident in Chan also involved non-
seamen.448 Thus, it is anomalous that in both cases neither 
the Jones Act nor DOHSA applied, yet, in Earles II, the Ninth 
Circuit awarded loss of society damages, while one month 
later, in Chan, the court denied such recovery.449 
2. Split Circuits 
The circuits are split over when, or whether, federal courts 
can award loss of society damages in a maritime wrongful 
death action.450 The unfair treatment of Jones Act seaman in 
the Earles II decision is accentuated when contrasted with the 
First Circuit case, Rollins v. Peterson Builders, Inc. 451 In 
Rollins, the strong bond between the decedent-seaman and her 
beneficiary-mother had been painstakingly demonstrated to 
the court, whereas in Earles II there was little evidence of 
mutually supportive relationships between the five decedents 
and their parents.452 When not "shipping-out," the decedent 
in Rollins lived at home.453 At least two of the decedents in 
Earles II did not live with their parents, and as to the other 
three, no evidence of common residency was established.454 
Furthermore, with regard to one of the decedent's in Earles II, 
the record established that he had no contact with his non-
dependent father-beneficiary for several years prior to his 
446. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 908; Miles, 498 U.S. at 32·33. 
447. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17; Miles, 498 U.S. at 32-33. 
448. Chan, 39 F.3d at 1401-02; Earles II, 26 F.3d at 908. 
449. See Chan, 39 F.3d at ·1407-08; but cf. Emery v. Rock Island Boatworks, 
Inc., 847 F. Supp. 114, 116-18 (E.D. lll. 1994) (holding that the spouse of a non-
seaman injured in state waters could recover loss of society damages because nei-
ther the Jones Act nor DORSA precluded or limited damages). 
450. See supra notes 10, 136-37 and accompanying text for a discussion on the 
split among circuits. 
451. Rollins v. Peterson Builders, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 918 (D.R.I. 1990). 
452. See Rollins, 761 F. Supp. at 920; Earles v. United States ("Earles I"), 935 
F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1991). 
453. Rollins, 761 F. Supp. at 920. 
454. See Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for Appellant at 15-
20, Earles II (No. 92-55548). -
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death, and he contributed no support whatsoever to his benefi-
ciary-mother.455 Finally, the tragic electrocution of the dece-
dent in Rollins occurred within the course and scope of her 
employment as a seaman, while the accident in Earles II re-
sulted in part from a night of heavy drinking and the criminal 
negligence of one of the plaintiffs.456 Moreover, the accident 
in Rollins happened while the decedent's mother had just 
boarded the research vessel in order to greet her daughter 
after an extended sea voyage.457 
Arguably, when maritime rules are replaced, by factors 
that the majority of state and federal courts apply when deter-
mining whether to award loss of society damages,45S and 
those factors are applied to the facts of RolliTJ,s and Earles II, it 
appears that recovery in Rollins was more justified than in 
Earles II.459 Yet, in Earles II substantial recovery for loss of 
society was awarded, while in Rollins, recovery for loss of soci-
ety was denied because of outmoded and inflexible maritime 
statutory constraints coupled with the Supreme Court's recent 
decision in Miles.460 Essentially, recovery was denied in 
Rollins, because the decedent was a seaman.461 
455. See Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for Appellant at 20, 
Earles II (No. 92-55548). 
456. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text for a discussion on the facts 
of Earles II. 
457. Rollins, 761 F. Supp. at 920. 
458. See infra note 535 for a list of factors admiralty courts might consider in 
determining whether a beneficiary could recover for loss of society. 
459. See Sutton v. Earles ("Earles II"), 26 F.3d 903, 917 n.18 (9th Cir. 1994); 
Rollins, 761 F. Supp. at 929. 
460. See Rollins, 761 F. Supp. at 929; supra note 33 and accompanying text for 
the amount of loss of society damages awarded in Earles 11. 
461. See Rollins, 761 F. Supp. at 929. The Ninth Circuit in Earles II misrepre-
sented the ultimate holding in Rollins, which denied non-dependent parents of a 
seaman standing to recover loss of society under general maritime law, by citing it 
for the proposition that loss of society could be awarded to beneficiaries of non-
seamen regardless of dependency. See Earles 11, 26 F.3d at 917 n.18. An accurate 
reading of Rollins reveals the district court's rationale for attempting to extend 
recovery for loss of society to the non-dependent mother was that: 
Gaudet . . . already determined that . . . [special) solici-
tude warrants an award of loss of society damages to a 
spouse of a seaman who is . . . killed. It is a small step 
indeed to find that the same solicitude should extend to 
the parents of a deceased seaman. . . . 
Rollins, 761 F. Supp. at 924 (emphasis added); see KIPLING, supra 'note I, at 216. 
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a. Fifth Circuit 
A district court deciding a case on remand from the Fifth 
Circuit has directly criticized the decision in Earles II.402 In 
Walker v. Braus403 the court declined to follow Earles II, be-
cause the court reasoned that the Ninth Circuit's holding in 
Earles II was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision 
in Miles. 464 The court explained that Earles II created non-
uniform recovery, within the Ninth Circuit, based on status of 
the decedent.465 The Walker Court cited Smith v. Trinidad 
Corp. as an example of such non-uniformity, because the Ninth 
Circuit, just one year prior to Earles II, held that the uniformi-
ty requirement of Miles compelled the conclusion that the 
spouse of an injured seaman could not recover for loss of soci-
ety under general maritime law.466 The court continued, 
"[Earles II] therefore creates an anomaly in the Ninth Circuit: 
The beneficiaries of seamen - traditionally the wards of admi-
ralty - cannot recover damages that beneficiaries of non-
seamen are permitted to recover. The Supreme Court's decision 
in Miles was designed to eliminate these kinds of inconsistent 
results."467 With this declaration, the district court, by direc-
tion of the Fifth Circuit, aligned itself with the Second Circuit's 
holding in Wahlstrom and the Sixth Circuit's holding in Ander-
son, declining to award loss of society damages to the non-
dependent beneficiaries of non-seamen killed in territorial 
462. Walker v. Braus, 861 F. Supp. 527 (E.n. La. 1994) (holding that the bene-
ficiaries of a non-seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of soci-
ety damages under general maritime law), remand before decision, 995 F.2d 77 
(5th Cir. 1993). 
463. 861 F. Supp. 527 (E.n. La. 1994), remand before decision, 995 F.2d 77 (5th 
Cir. 1993). . 
464. Walker, 861 F. Supp. at 536. 
465. [d. 
466. [d.; see Smith v. Trinidad Corp., 992 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that 
the wife of an injured seaman could not recover loss of society damages under the 
maritime law); see also supra notes 305-11 and accompanying text for a discussion 
on Smith. 
467. Walker, 861 F. Supp. at 536. 
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waters.468 
b. Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit has recently re-affirmed its policy for 
awarding loss of society in general maritime law when neither 
DORSA nor the Jones Act apply.469 In Zicherman v. Korean 
Air Lines470 and Air Disaster at Lockerbie Scotland on Decem-
ber 21, 1988 {"Lockerbie"),471 the Second Circuit applied feder-
al maritime law to the downings of two transoceanic airline 
flights.472 The court in Zicherman held that the non-depen-
dent relative of one of the victims could not recover loss of 
society damages, and remanded the award made to another 
relative pending disposition of a trial on the dependency is-
sue.473 The court in Lockerbie held that loss of society damag-
es were allowed to the spouse and dependent children of one of 
the victims, but declined to award loss of society to the family 
of another victim, because the claimants included non-depen-
dent adult children of the decedent.474 The Second Circuit, in 
both cases, cited Miles, Sistrunk, and Anderson for the proposi-
tion that general maritime law extends loss of society to no one 
468. See supra notes 10, 136-37 and accompanying text for a discussion on the 
split among circuits. 
469. Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., No. 93-7490, 1994 WL 685690, at 
*3-4 (2d Cir. Dec. 5, 1994) (holding that federal maritime law does not allow re-
covery for loss of society to non-dependent family members); Air Disaster at 
Lockerbie Scotland on December 21, 1988, 37 F.3d 804, 828-30 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(holding that federal maritime law does not allow recovery for loss of society to 
non-dependent family members). 
470. No. 93-7490, 1994 WL 685690, at *3-4 (2nd Cir. Dec. 5, 1994). 
471. 37 F.3d 804, 828-30 (2nd Cir. 1994). 
472. Zicherman, 1994 WL 685690, at ·3-4; Lockerbie, 37 F.3d at 828-30. Ameri-
can courts apply the general maritime law to the issue of damages in an interna-
tional air disaster because, under the Warsaw Convention, damages are measured 
according to the internal law of the party to the convention. Lockerbie, 37 F.3d at 
828-30. United States District Courts apply maritime case law when holding that 
a federal action for wrongful death exists under the Warsaw Convention, because 
the general maritime law is one of the oldest bodies of federal judge-made law. rd. 
See In re Mexico City Aircrash of October 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 414-15 (9th Cir 
1983); see also supra note 3. Therefore, the general maritime law is the appropri-
ate body of federal law to apply when deciding whether to include loss of society 
damages under the Warsaw Convention. Lockerbie, 37 F.3d at 828-30. 
473. Zicherman, 1994 WL 685690, at *3-4. 
474. Lockerbie, 37 F.3d at 828-30. 
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other than spouses and dependents.476 
Zicherman and Lockerbie affirm the Second Circuit's ad-
herence to the dependency rule for awarding loss of society 
damages in general maritime law despite the Ninth Circuit's 
earlier decision in Earles II.476 Moreover, by remanding the 
trial court's award of loss of society to one of the relatives of 
the decedent for a determination on the dependency issue, the 
Second Circuit demonstrated that some factual analysis of loss 
must be undertaken.477 Zicherman and Lockerbie thus add to 
the proposition that dependency has developed into a principle 
factor when awarding loss of society damages under the gener-
al maritime law, and illustrate the present split in the circuits 
caused by the Ninth Circuit's Earles II decision.478 
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN EARLES II IS INCONSIS-
TENT WITH CURRENT SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON 
AWARDING Loss OF SOCIETY DAMAGES IN MARITIME 
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS 
Arguably, the Ninth Circuit in Earles II misapplied the 
Supreme Court's approach to uniform recovery under general 
maritime law, as announced in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 
and misapplied the doctrine of special solicitude.479 In Earles 
II, the Ninth Circuit noted that, albeit sub silentio, the Su-
preme Court had sanctioned non-uniform recovery in general 
maritime wrongful death actions when, in Higginbotham, the 
Court foreclosed loss of society damages to the beneficiaries of 
475. Zicherman, 1994 WL 685690, at *3; Lockerbie, 37 F.3d at 830. The court 
in Lockerbie stated, "We find no maritime case extending loss of society damages 
to plaintiffs other than spouses and dependents." Lockerbie, 37 F.3d at 830. Appar-
ently the court was not aware of the Ninth Circuit's holding in Earles II. 
476. See Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17; see supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
477. See Zicherman, 1994 WL 685690, at *3-4; See infra notes 534-43 and ac-
companying text for a discussion on factors admiralty courts might consider in 
determining whether a beneficiary could recover for loss of society. 
478. See Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17. 
479. See Walker v. Braus, 861 F. Supp. 527, 31-38 (E.D. La. 1994), remand 
before decision, 995 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the beneficiaries of a 
non-seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages 
under general maritime law); see also Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 
33-37 (1990) (holding that the non-dependent parent of a seaman killed in territo-
rial waters could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime law). 
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those killed on the high seas, while not overruling Gaudet 
which allowed such recovery to the beneficiaries of those killed 
in territorial waters.480 However, since the Supreme Court 
ruled on the propriety of non-uniform damages in actions 
brought by the beneficiaries of Jones Act seamen in Miles, the 
Court has not spoken on whether the elements of damages 
permitted to wrongful death beneficiaries of non-seamen may 
differ from the recovery allowed to the beneficiaries of sea-
men.481 
1. The Ninth Circuit Misapplied the Doctrine of Uniformity 
There appears to be no good reason for requiring uniformi-
ty between elements of damages allowed to beneficiaries of 
seamen and those allowed to beneficiaries of non-seamen.482 
However, if there must be non-uniform recovery, recovery 
allowed to seamen's beneficiaries should not be less than that 
awarded to the beneficiaries of non-seamen, because the ratio-
nale for awarding the beneficiaries of non-seamen extended 
damages is at odds with uniformity of the general maritime 
law, while the public policy granting seamen "special solici-
tude" is firmly rooted in jurisprudence and legislative enact-
ment.483 Although the notion of keeping the general maritime 
law current with developments in the common law is both a 
sound and persuasive reason for developing the law of mari-
time damages,484 uniformity and special solicitude tQgether 
compel the conclusion that, if non-uniformity in maritime 
480. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 916; see Mobil Oil v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 
622-26 (1978). 
481. See supra notes 93-137 for a discussion on the Supreme Court's treatment 
of the loss of society issue under general maritime law. See also infra notes 483-
95 for a discussion on the breadth of the constitutional doctrine of uniformity in 
general. 
482. Walker, 861 F. Supp. at 537-38 n.14; see supra notes I, 5, 14, 47-55, 79-82 
and accompanying text for a discussion on the principles of uniformity and special 
solicitude. 
483. See supra notes 5, 47-48 and accompanying text for a discussion on special 
solicitude. 
484. It is arguable that the Ninth Circuit's decision in Earles II was not an at-
tempt at developing the general maritime law consistent with the common law, 
because it is apparently not the majority rule outside of admiralty jurisdiction to 
award loss of society type damages regardless of factors tending to prove loss, 
such as financial dependency. See STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., RECOVERY FOR 
WRONGFUL DEATH AND INJURY §§ 3:1, :50, at 5-19, 221-39 (3d ed. 1992). 
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wrongful death recovery is to be sanctioned, recovery allowed 
to seamen's beneficiaries should not be less than that awarded 
to the beneficiaries of non-seamen.485 
The grant of admiralty jurisdiction itself supports the 
argument that uniformity between damages for seamen and 
non-seamen may require that recovery for non-seamen should 
not be greater than that allowed to seamen.486 One year prior 
to deciding Miles, the Supreme Court decided Sisson v. Ru-
by,487 the most recent case in a long line of cases clarifying 
when admiralty tort jurisdiction arises for the purpose of ap-
plying the general maritime law.488 Significant to the argu-
ment that seamen's recovery should be at least uniform with 
non-seamen's recovery, the Court discussed the scope and 
application of the principle of uniformity: 
Although we recognized that protecting commer-
cial shipping is at the heart of admiralty juris-
diction, we also [note] that that interest 'cannot 
be adequately served if admiralty jurisdiction is 
restricted to those individuals actually engaged 
in commercial maritime activity. This interest 
can be fully vindicated only if all operators of 
vessels on navigable waters are subject to uni-
form rules.... The failure to recognize the 
breadth of this federal interest ignores the po-
tential effect of non-commercial maritime activi-
ty on maritime commerce. The potential disrup-
tive impact of a collision between two boats on 
navigable waters,... compels the conclusion 
that [a] ... collision between two pleasure boats 
on navigable waters has a significant relation-
ship with maritime commerce.489 
Thus, it can not be ignored that the Supreme Court has recent-
ly spoken on the "breadth" of the principle of uniformity in 
general, and has held that the principle of uniformity, in at 
485. See Anderson, 894 F.2d at 811-12; see also Wahlstrom, 4 F.3d at 1090-93; 
Walker, 861 F. Supp. at 535; but see Earles II, 26 F.3d at 916-17. 
486. See Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 (1990). 
487. 497 U.S. 358 (1990) (clarifying the test used to determine when admiralty 
tort jurisdiction applies). 
488. Sisson, 497 U.S. at 362. 
489. ld. (emphasis in original). 
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least one context, applies equally between pleasure boaters, 
such as the decedents in Earles II, and commercial mariners, 
such as Jones Act seamen.490 
The question presents itself: Why does the present anoma-
ly in damages recovery exist? Although today, the Jones Act's 
limitation on non-pecuniary damages appears draconian, when 
Congress enacted the Jones act in 1920, the act was consistent 
with the principle of "special solicitude."491 However, by 
adopting the Jones Act, Congress dropped anchor on the law of 
seamen.492 As a result, the law of seamen has not progressed 
with more modern and liberal ideas concerning recovery.493 
Thus, perhaps the best explanation for the current anomaly is 
that admiralty courts, in trying to keep pace with common law 
developments outside the maritime context, have incorporated 
current common law developments into the general maritime 
law, but are unable or unwilling to do so when constrained by 
outdated statutes.494 The Ninth Circuit's decision in Earles II 
is one example of this incorporation.495 As the court in Earles 
II suggested, because the history of maritime law shows that 
the courts have been ordained with great power to develop the 
law, it follows that the courts need not develop the law in a 
manner entirely consistent with legislative intent, but must do 
490. Id. 
491. The Jones Act was a progressive act when enacted as evinced by the fact 
that it allowed plaintiffs a negligence action against their employer under a "pure 
comparative fault" standard of liability. See The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 
119-24 (1936); 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988). Traditional common law tort defenses, 
such as assumption of the risk, were therefore not a bar to recovery under the 
Jones Act. The Arizona, 298 U.S. at 119-24. See supra notes 79-82 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of special solicitude for seamen. 
492. See Miles, 498 U.S. at 33-37 (1990) (loss of society not allowed to a 
seaman's mother); cf. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17 (loss of society extended to non-
dependent parents of non-seamen). 
493. See Miles, 498 U.S. at 33-37 (1990) (loss of society not allowed to a 
seaman's mother); cf. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17 (loss of society extended to non-
dependent parents of non-seamen). 
494. See Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17. One commentator has noted that, "[g)iven 
the embryonic stage of seaman's rights under the general maritime law in 1920," 
the better question to ask when awarding damages is: What was Congressional 
intent at that time as to incorporating future rights of recovery as they develop in 
the common law? Steven G. Flynn, Punitive Damages After Haslip & Miles v. 
Apex Marine: Allowable for Everyone but Seamen?, 5 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 155, 165 
(1992). 
495. See Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17. 
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so in a way so as to achieve justice.496 Disturbingly, in Earles 
II, this charge conflicted with the uniformity of general mari-
time law. 497 
2. The Ninth Circuit Misapplied the Doctrine of Special 
Solicitude 
The leading case advocating liberal remedies in admiralty, 
The Sea Gull,498 was decided in 1865. In The Sea Gull, the 
husband of a woman killed in a collision between vessels on 
Chesapeake Bay filed an action seeking damages against the 
SEA GULL in rem, the alleged tortious vesse1.499 The lower 
court applied the prevailing common law rule at the time, that 
a cause of action dies with its possessor.500 On appeal, Justice 
Chase explained that the rule against wrongful death was a 
species of common law.501 The appeals court asserted that al-
though the common law was generally opposed to wrongful 
death claims, equity and general principles of natural law were 
in favor.502 Therefore, the court reasoned that because mari-
time law owes its heritage to the civil law and equity, and 
because equity favors such suits, "certainly it better becomes 
the humane and liberal character of proceedings in admiralty 
to give than to withhold the remedy, when not required to 
withhold it by established and inflexible rules."503 
It is important to note that the policy the court advocated 
in The Sea Gull is not the same cause embraced by American 
maritime jurisprudence which considers seamen the "wards of 
admiralty" deserving of "special solicitude" for the hazards 
496. [d. at 917 (noting that, becau8e neither the Jones Act nor DOHSA other-
wise applied, the Ninth Circuit did not consider itself guided by the principle of 
uniformity, but rather by the humanitarian component of the general maritime 
law). 
497. See Miles, 498 U.S. at 33-37; see also Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 622-26; 
Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 585-90 (1974); Moragne v. States Ma-
rine Lines, 398 U.s. 375, 387-88, 397-402 (1970). 
498. 21 F. Cas. 909 (C.C.D. Md. 1865) (the leading case employing broad lan-
guage to advocate flexible remedies in admiralty proceedings). 
499. The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909 (C.C.D. Md. 1865). 
500. [d. 
501. [d. 
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encountered in the every day service of their employment. 504 
Today however, the two notions have apparently been made 
interchangeable by judicial confusion. 505 Beadle v. 
Spencer506 and The Arizona,507 are two cases that stand for 
the proposition that, because of the greater risks borne by 
seamen, their rights to recovery have traditionally been broad-
er than those extended to non-seamen.508 However, these cas-
es do not embrace the policy that all who venture on the seas 
deserve special solicitude; these cases stand for the proposition 
that only those that make their living at sea do.509 Therefore, 
it follows that the beneficiaries of seamen are intended to re-
ceive, at least uniform, if not greater recovery, than the benefi-
ciaries of non-seamen.510 The "humane and liberal character" 
of admiralty law notwithstanding, it is apparent that that is 
not the present state of the law in the Ninth Circuit. 511 
504. See The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. at 910; but cf. Harden v. Gordon, 11 F.Cas. 
480, 482 (C.C.D. Me. 1823). 
505. See Walker, 861 F.Supp. at 537 n.14. 
506. 298 U.S. 124 (1936) (noting that because of the greater risks borne by 
seamen, their rights to recovery have traditionally been broader than those recog-
nized in land-based tort law); but cf. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17. 
507. 298 U.S. 110 (1936) (noting that because of the greater risks borne by 
seamen, their rights to recovery have traditionally been broader than those recog-
nized in land-based tort law); but cf. Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17. 
508. Beadle v. Spencer, 298 U.S. 124, 129-30 (1936); The Arizona, 298 U.S. 110, 
119-24 (1936). But see Miles, 498 U.S. at 33-37 (loss of society not allowed to 
seaman's mother); Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914·17 (loss of society extended to non-
dependent parents of non-seamen). See supra notes 5, 47·48 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of special solicitude toward seamen. 
509. See Beadle, 298 U.S. at 129-30; The Arizona, 298 U.S. at 119-24; see also 
Harden, 11 F.Cas. at 482; Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 394 
n.11. (1970). Although Moragne stands for the proposition that a wrongful death 
cause of action exists under the general maritime law, it is at least noteworthy 
that, in that case, the Court's humanitarian policy was extended to the beneficiary 
of a "Sieracki seaman." ld.; see also, e.g., Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 
573, 585-90 (1974) (holding that the spouse of a "Sieracki seaman" killed in terri-
torial waters could recover loss of society damages). See supra note 44. Although 
the Supreme Court in Higginbotham declined to award loss of society damages to 
the beneficiaries of a "longshoreman" based on the "preclusive effects" of DOHSA, 
it should be noted that, by the time of that case, the Sieracki seaman doctrine 
had been abolished. Mobil Oil v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625-26 (1978). 
510. See Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17 (extending loss of society recovery to non-
dependent parents of non-seamen); but see Davis v. Bender Shipbuilding, 27 F.3d 
426 (9th Cir. 1994) (declining to award loss of society damages to the family mem-
bers of a seaman); Smith v. Trinidad Corp., 992 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1993) (declin-
ing to award loss of society damages to the family members of a seaman). 
511. See, e.g., Earles II, 26 F.3d at 917; see supra note 1 regarding seamen's 
rights. 
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Because the Supreme Court in Gaudet used broad lan-
guage that did not limit loss of society only to longshoremen in 
territorial waters, many lower courts have interpreted Gaudet 
as extending "special solicitude" beyond seamen, to all who 
bring suit in admiralty jurisdiction.512 However, this exten-
sion of solicitude to non-seamen is arguably incorrect because, 
both Moragne and Gaudet did not deal with "non-seamen," but 
more precisely dealt with "longshoremen," who at the time, 
courts were extending solicitude to as "Sieracki seamen."513 
Thus, it is arguable that Moragne and Gaudet were never 
intend to extended special solicitude beyond the realm of sea-
men, even though lower courts have since taken it upon them-
selves to do so by relying on these two cases.514 Moreover, the 
extension of solicitude to non-seamen appears to be in deroga-
tion of the rationale behind the principle, which favors extend-
ed remedies for seamen based on settled public policy.515 If 
Congress wishes to abandon this policy it should announce its 
intention to do so in a maritime tort reform package.516 Until 
such time however, courts should take better care not to inter-
pret the "special" out of "special solicitude."517 
Derogation of the principle of special solicitude has result-
ed in a reversal of the rules between seamen and non-sea-
men.518 In reaction to the interpretation that some courts 
have given to Gaudet, two prominent commentators have noted 
that, because Gaudet allowed greater recovery than that which 
had been previously available under the federal wrongful death 
512. See supra notes 44, 510 and accompanying text for a discussion on the 
legal treatment of longshoremen and the extension of solicitude to non-seamen. 
See, e.g., Earles II, 26 F.3d at 917. 
513. See supra note 44 for a discussion on the "Sieracki seaman" doctrine. 
514. See Walker, 861 F. Supp. at 537 n.14. 
515. See supra notes 5, 47-48, 79-82 and accompanying text for a discussion on 
the duel economic and humanitarian policy of special solicitude. 
516. See Steven K Carr, Living and Dying in the Post-Miles World: A Review 
of Compensatory and Punitive Damages Following Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 68 
TuL. L. REV. 595, 624-25 (1994) (noting that in the wake of Miles it is apparent 
legislative and maritime tort reform is needed to provide uniformity in awarding 
non-pecuniary elements of tort recovery under maritime law). See also MARITIME 
LEGISLATION COMM., MARITIME LAw AsS'N OF THE U.S., Uniform Maritime Stan-
dards for Award of Punitive Damages (Final Draft Proposal Aug. 6, 1993). 
517. See supra notes 1, 5, 44, 47-48, 79-82 and accompanying text regarding 
seamen's rights and discussing the principles of uniformity and special solicitude. 
518. See Walker, 861 F. Supp. at 537-38. 
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statutes, and under most state wrongful death statutes, from 
the point of view of a beneficiary, there are advantages if their 
decedent's fatal accident occurs on navigable waters rather 
than on an interstate highway.519 The Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion in Earles II, extending loss of society damages to non-
dependent parents, was based precisely on this misinterpreted 
notion of special solicitude.520 
The issue begs resolution: What policy can possibly justify 
the anomalous recovery that would have occurred between the 
beneficiaries of seamen and non-seamen had the WHISKEY 
RUNNER not hit a buoy, but instead had collided with a fish-
ing boat in the harbor, and some crew members on the fishing 
boat were killed? In order to remedy the current anomalies 
illustrated by the Ninth Circuit's holding in Earles II, Congress 
should revamp the maritime remedial scheme to allow damag-
es commensurate with the common law of torts and make 
provisions for flexible treatment of developments therein.521 
In the alternative, the Supreme Court should define the ele-
ments of recoverable damages for wrongful death of a non-
seaman in territorial waters; after twenty five years of "further 
sifting" in the lower courts, the time is ripe.522 
3. Even if Loss of Society Damages are Allowed to 
Beneficiaries of Non-Seamen in General Maritime Law 
Wrongful Death Actions, Admiralty Courts Should Engage 
in a Factual Analysis of Loss. Before Extending Recovery to 
All Beneficiaries With Standing 
In Earles II, the Ninth Circuit implicitly denied any dis-
tinction between elements of damages the court awarded when 
it resolved the loss of society dependency issue by asserting 
that parents had standing to recover under DOHSA and the 
Jones Act regardless of dependency.523 Although it is true 
that the parents had standing to recover damages by analogy 
519. GRANT GILMORE AND CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY, § 6-
33, at 370 (2d ed. 1975). 
520. See Earles II, 26 F.3d at 917. 
521. See supra note 510. 
522. See supra note 10, 133-37 and accompanying text. 
523. See Sutton v. Earles ("Earles II"), 26 F.3d 903, 915 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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to DORSA, that did not necessarily mean that they could re-
cover all eiements of damages absent proof of 10ss.524 The 
overwhelming majority of federal courts deciding the issue 
under the general maritime law do not allow loss of society to 
non-dependents, because such a rule is a rational and efficient 
method of fashioning a schedule of beneficiaries for loss of 
society.525 
524. See SPEISER, supra note 484, § 3:51, at 238-41 (3d ed. 1992) (noting that 
generally, before loss of society damages can be awarded, proof of loss must be 
established, and that a suitor's relationship is merely one factor to consider). Note 
that the Supreme Court in Gaudet cited Speiser as authority for' propositions on 
wrongful death law when the Court introduced recovery for loss of society into the 
general maritime law, including the weighty proposition that recovery for such loss 
was the majority trend in American jurisprudence. See Sea-Land Services v. 
Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 585-88 (1974). 
525. See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., No. 93-7490, 1994 WL 
685690, at *3-4 (2d Cir. Dec. 5, 1994) (holding that federal maritime law does not 
allow recovery for loss of society to non-dependent family members); see also Air 
Disaster at Lockerbie Scotland on December 21, 1988, 37 F.3d 804, 828-30 (2d Cir. 
1994) (holding that federal maritime law does not allow recovery for loss of society 
to non-ciependent family members); Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 4 
F.3d 1084, 1090-93 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the non-dependent parents of a 
non-seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of society damages 
under general maritime law), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1060 (1994); Anderson v. 
Whittaker Corp., 894 F.2d 804, 811-12 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that the non-depen-
dent parents of non-seamen killed in territorial waters could not recover loss of 
society damages under general maritime law); Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 989 
(5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the non-dependent parent of a seaman killed in terri-
torial waters could not recover loss of society damages under general maritime 
law), affd sub nom. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990); Sistrunk v. 
Circle Bar Drilling Co., 770 F.2d 455, 458-60 (5th Cir. 1985), reh'g denied, 775 
F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1019 (1986); Fajardo v. Maersk 
Line Agency, 1989 A.M.C. 1923, 1924-28 (D. Md. 1988) (not otherwise reported); 
Truehart v. Blandon, 672 F. Supp. 929, 936-38 (E.D. La. 1987); Glad v. American 
President Lines, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 183, 184-86 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Lipworth v. 
Kawasaki Motors Corp. U.S.A., 592 So. 2d 1151, 1154-55 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1992) 
(holding the non-dependent parents of non-seamen killed in territorial waters could 
not recover loss of society damages under general maritime law); Perlman v. 
Valdes, 575 So. 2d 216, 216-17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the non-
dependent parents of a non-seaman killed in territorial waters could not recover 
loss of society damages under general maritime law); but see Earles II, 26 F.3d at 
914-917 (holding that loss of society damages could be awarded to the parents of 
non-seamen killed in territorial waters regardless of dependency). Cf Evich v. 
Connelly, 759 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that because siblings are not 
spouses, children, or parents they must, like under DOHSA, prove dependency to 
recover damages for maritime wrongful death). See generally Cantore v. Blue La-
goon Water Sports, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1151, 1152-55 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (holding that 
the parents of non-seamen killed in territorial waters may recover loss of society 
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Whether a dependency rule is fair, however, is arguable, 
because it is conceivable a non-dependent beneficiary might 
suffer a genuine loss from being denied their decedent's contin-
ued existence.526 In Rollins v. Peterson Builders, Inc. for ex-
ample, the record denotes an association between the decedent 
and her beneficiary that evidenced loss of society, yet the bene-
ficiary was non-dependent.527 Thus, if loss of society damage 
awards are to remain at the discretion of trial courts, and if 
the majority of courts applying federal maritime law apply a 
dependency rule, whether the beneficiary is a financial depen-
dent of the decedent should at least be a factor.528 
If loss of society damages remain recoverable under the 
general maritime law, a fair solution to awarding them is that 
it be reversible error for a trial judge to award loss of society 
damages without first considering factors tending to establish 
the right to recover.529 This approach with regard to proof of 
loss is in accord with the majority of state jurisdictions and 
federal court actions where loss of society type damages are 
allowed.530 Patton-Tully and Neal are two Fifth Circuit admi-
ralty cases where this type of fact analysis was employed.531 
The Second and Sixth Circuits' decisions in Zicherman and 
Anderson have also taken this approach.532 Moreover, in 
Bergen, even the Ninth Circuit itself scrutinized dependency 
when deciding whether to award wrongful death recovery 
while sitting in admiralty.533 
Among factors the district courts should consider when 
deciding whether to award loss of society in maritime cases, 
dependency should be paramount, giving deference to the great 
526. See Zicherman, 1994 WL 685690, at *3 (noting that "[nlo doubt [a depen-
dencyl rule denies recovery to some deserving parties; nondependent survivors may 
feel the loss of a loved one as keenly as dependent survivors."); Rollins v. Peterson 
Builders, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 918, 921-24 <n.R.I. 1990). 
527. Rollins, 761 F. Supp. at 920·24. 
528. See SPEISER, supra note 484, § 3:51, at 238-41. 
529. See id. 
530. SPEISER, supra note 484, § 3:51, at 238-41. 
531. Patton-Tully Transp. Co. v. Ratliff, 797 F.2d 206, 208-213 (5th Cir. 1986); 
Neal v. Barisich, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 862, 872-73 (E.D. La. 1989), affd, 889 F.2d 
273 (5th Cir. 1989). 
532. Zicherman, 1994 WL 685690, at *3·4; Anderson, 894 F.2d at 811-12. 
533. See supra note 300 and discussing Bergen. 
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weight of authority in the non-seamen context which consider 
dependency the critical factor. 534 Other factors admiralty 
courts should consider were suggested by Neal (common resi-
dency, habit of the deceased to tender comfort) and Rollins 
(common residency, harmonious family relations, participation 
of deceased in family activities).535 Moreover, the proposed 
solution is in accord with the Fifth Circuit's recent pronounce-
ment in Randall, and the Second Circuit's recent dicta in 
Zicherman, that awards for loss of society damages should not 
solely be based on dependency because deserved parties could 
necessarily be excluded.536 Under the proposed solution, such 
deserved parties could recover because no one factor would be 
determinative.537 
5,34. See supra note 137. 
535. See SPEISER, supra note 484, § 3:51, at 241. Speiser's factors, priority 
ranked from senior to junior, are as follows: 
(1) Familial Relationship; 
(2) Financial Dependency;* 
(3) Continuous Residency; 
(4) Harmonious Relations; 
(5) Common Interests; 
(6) Participation in Family Activities; 
(7) Habit to Tender Solace; 
(8) Value of Advice. 
See id.; *dependency is inserted at the rank at which it might be considered. 
536. Zicherman, 1994 WL 685690, at *3 (noting that "[n)o doubt [a dependency) 
rule denies recovery to some deserving parties; non-dependent survivors may feel 
the loss of a loved one as keenly as dependent survivors."); Randall v. Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc., 13 F.3d 888, 903 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that, "[i)n our view, the law 
of this circuit does not unequivocally limit recovery of loss of society damages for 
the wrongful death of a parent to children who are financially dependent on the 
decedent."); see also Complaint of Nobles, 842 F. Supp. 1430, 1434 n.8 (N.D. Fla. 
1993) (noting that, "[t)his court finds that the reasoning that ties recovery for loss 
of society to financial dependency strained, and, therefore, will not adhere to the 
conclusion reached [that dependency is determinative)); Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki 
Heavy Indus., Ltd., 4 F.3d 1084, 1092 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that, "an essentially 
pecuniary standard such as dependency should not provide the dividing line . . . 
given the [non-pecuniary) nature of loss of society damages"), cert. denied, 114 
S. Ct. 1060 (1994); Choat v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 1994 A.M.C. 2626, 2640 (Ala. 
1994) (declining loss of society damages regardless of dependency). But cf. Walker 
v. Braus, 861 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. La. 1994) (recognizing that by concluding loss of 
society damages are not allowed in a general maritime wrongful death action, 
"implies that the dependency requirement for recovering loss of society damages 
under general maritime law is no longer viable"), remand before decision, 995 F.2d 
77 (5th Cir. 1993); Earles 11, 26 F.3d at 914-17 (awarding loss of society damages 
regardless of dependency). 
537. See SPEISER, supra note 484, § 3:51, at 238-41. Although Earles 11 could 
appear to comport with the proposed solution (because therein the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the parents' awards for loss of society regardless of dependency), it 
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In Gaudet, the Supreme Court noted that loss of society 
was measurable by trial courts and that, if not, appellate 
courts had the ability to control excessive awards. 538 The 
Court therefore granted the district courts discretion to award 
loss of society damages pursuant to their constitutional grant 
of admiralty jurisdiction and consistent with that grant's im-
plicit mandate on uniformity.639 In Higginbotham, the Court 
counseled the district courts not to unduly effect uniformity by 
awarding substantial damages for loss of society in non-sea-
men cases.540 Therefore, when, as in Earles II, a district court 
declines to analyze proof of loss, and then awards substantial 
recovery for loss of society to the beneficiaries of non-seamen, 
its judgment should be vacated.541 Moreover, when an ap-
peals court, as the Ninth Circuit, affirms such an award based 
on an anomaly in admiralty uniformity, the decision should be 
reversed.542 Doing so would ensure that admiralty courts eq-
uitably award loss of society damages, and further the aim of 
uniformity by precluding appellate courts from creating anom-
alous rules. 643 
should be obvious that, under the proposed solution, the awards would warrant 
further consideration because the district court failed to consider any factors when 
awarding recovery. See supra note 535 listing factors that admiralty courts might 
consider in determining whether a beneficiary could recover for loss of society. 
538. Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 590. 
539. [d. 
540. Mobil Oil v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 624-25 n.20 (1978). 
541. See Steven K. Carr, Living and Dying in the Post-Miles World: A Review 
of Compensatory and Punitive Damages Following Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 68 
TUL. L. REV. 595, 624-25 (1994) (hypothesizing that appellate review would possi-
bly remedy the anomalies caused by the few district and state court decision 
which strayed from the majority's broad interpretation of the uniformity component 
in Miles). 
542. See Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 624-25 n.20 (1978). 
543. See, e.g., Earles II, 26 F.3d at 914-17; Walker, 861 F. Supp. at 527, 535 
(noting that the Ninth Circuit's holding in Earles II creates non-uniformity be-
tween circuits, non-uniformity within the Ninth Circuit, and is non-uniform with 
basic admiralty law tenets). It should be noted the proposed solution assumes los8 
of society is still allowable in the post-Miles era. See id. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of uniformity has been a dominant theme in 
the general maritime law since the Supreme Court first ex-
plained its special significance to American maritime jurispru-
dence over a century ago.644 Another well-settled matter in 
general maritime law is that the humane character of proceed-
ings in admiralty provide "special solicitude" to seamen.545 In 
Earles II, the Ninth Circuit decided that loss of society damag-
es could be liberally extended to the non-dependent parents of 
non-seamen in a general maritime wrongful death action 
("Moragne action")M8 without conflicting with the spirit of the 
uniform recovery rule that the Supreme Court applied to sea-
men in Miles v. Apex Marine.547 
The Earles II holding is alarming because it is an example 
of the very anomaly in maritime wrongful death recovery that 
the Supreme Court sought to remedy by creating an action for 
wrongful death. in admiralty jurisdiction; that is that seamen, 
the "wards of admiralty," are provided less protection than 
non-seamen.548 Since the Ninth Circuit de-emphasized the 
principle of uniformity, the ultimate question now faced by 
practitioners, as well as District Courts sitting in admiralty 
within the Ninth Circuit, is whether the failure on the part of 
Congress to keep wrongful death damages consistent with 
544. See supra notes 14, 49-55 and accompanying text for a discussion on uni-
formity. 
545. Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 587-88 (1974) (holding that 
loss of society was incorporated into general maritime law, "to comport with the 
humanitarian policy of the maritime law to show 'special solicitude' for those who 
are injured within its jurisdiction."); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 
375, 386-88 (1970) (holding that a cause of action for wrongful death exists under 
general maritime law, because the common law rule denying a remedy for wrong-
ful death is unjust and incompatible with maritime equitable principles); The Sea 
Gull, 21 F. Cas 909, 910 (C.C.D. Md. 1865) (the leading case advocating that, "it 
better becomes the humane and liberal character of proceedings in admiralty to 
give [rather] than to withhold [al remedy, when not required to withhold it by 
established and inflexible rules."). See supra notes 5, 47-48 and accompanying text 
for a discussion on special solicitude. 
546. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 409 (creating a court-made wrongful death action 
in the general maritime law). 
547. Sutton v. Earles, ("Earles II") 26 F.3d 903, 916-17 (9th Cir. 1994); see also 
Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 33 (1990). 
548. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 395; Earles II, 26 F.3d at 916-17; see supra note 1. 
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"special solicitude for seamen" can be permitted to eviscerate 
the need for uniformity, which gives rise to the District Courts' 
grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in the first place. 
If so, the Supreme Court may ultimately be spared the necessi-
ty of deciding the issue of whether to award loss of society to 
the beneficiaries of non-seamen killed in territorial waters 
under general maritime law, because the issue would remain a 
policy decision for the lower courts to make on a case-by-case 
basis.549 If the Supreme Court continues on the course chart-
ed in Higginbotham and Miles, which favors uniformity gener-
ally, the Court must announce a rule for awarding damages to 
non-seamen's beneficiaries. One thing is certain, when courts 
fashion policy to escape the intent of antiquated and inflexible 
Congressional enactments, the need for review of those enact-
ments by Congress is in order.550 
With the wind of uniformity blowing from the Supreme 
Court, and the tide of recent general maritime case law deny-
ing non-dependents recovery for loss of society, the Ninth Cir-
cuit misapplied the law of maritime wrongful death damages 
by departing from the dependency requirement used in other 
circuits.551 In severing the federal interest in uniformity from 
the principle of liberal extension of remedies under the general 
549. See Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 590 (granting lower courts the discretion to calcu-
late and award loss of society damages); Moragne, 398 U.S. at 408 (declining to 
fashion a general maritime wrongful death schedule of beneficiaries and elements 
of damages identical to DORSA, thereby leaving open the issues of what damages 
could be recovered, and by whom, in a Moragne action). 
550. See Steven K. Carr, Living and Dying in the Post-Miles World: A Review 
of Compensatory and Punitive Damages Following Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 68 
TuL. L. REV. 595, 607-608 (1994) (noting that since Miles, the majority trend is to 
decline awards for loss of society in maritime wrongful death actions). Significant-
ly, Carr pointed out that at the time his paper was published, January, 1994, only 
a few district courts and state courts had strayed from the majority's broad inter-
pretation of the uniformity component of Miles. [d. Carr thus hypothesized that 
appellate review would possibly remedy the anomalies caused by Miles. [d. The 
Ninth Circuit has since chosen to aggravate the cleavage, between seamen's recov-
ery and non-seamen's recovery, that Miles causes when its uniform recovery rule 
is not applied in general maritime wrongful death cases involving non-seamen. 
551. See Cantore v. Blue Lagoon Water Sports, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1151, 1152-55 
(S.D. Fla. 1992) (holding that maritime wrongful death plaintiffs may recover loss 
of society damages for the death of non-seamen in territorial waters only if they 
are financial dependents of the decedent). See also supra notes 10, 137 and accom-
panying text for a discussion on the financial dependency requirement used by the 
majority of federal circuits vvhen awarding loss of society damages under the gen-
eral maritime law. 
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maritime law, the Ninth Circuit adopted a rule that is in con-
flict with both jurisdictional uniformity and "special solicitude" 
as it applies to seamen. 
Does limiting Miles' uniform recovery rule to seamen's 
cases, and then abandoning the "twin aims of admiralty" anal-
ysis to extend loss of society to the non-dependent beneficiaries 
of non-seamen provide uniformity to maritime law and solace 
to the families of seamen? Not with that wind blowing, and 
this tide.662 Since the Supreme Court decided Moragne, twen-
ty five years of "further sifting" through the lower courts has 
led to uncertainty for maritime practitioners, anomalous recov-
ery for maritime tort victims, and the current split in the cir-
cuits on the dependency issue. In order to prevent further 
injustice the Court should, heeding its own call for uniformity, 
announce a policy for awarding wrongful death damages to the 
beneficiaries of non-seamen killed in territorial waters. 
Arthur F. Mead, Ill" 
552. See KIPLING, supra note 1, at 216. 
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